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QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
 
NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS† 
ABSTRACT 
  Say you’re wealthy and want to influence American politics. How 
would you do it? Conventional campaign finance—giving or spending 
money to sway elections—is one option. Lobbying is another. This 
Article identifies and explores a third possibility: quasi campaign 
finance, or spending money on nonelectoral communications with 
voters that nevertheless rely on an electoral mechanism to be effective. 
Little is currently known about quasi campaign finance because no law 
requires its disclosure. But its use by America’s richest and politically 
savviest individuals—the Koch brothers, Michael Bloomberg, and the 
like—appears to be rising. It also seems to skew policy outcomes in the 
spenders’ preferred direction. 
  After introducing quasi campaign finance, the Article considers its 
legal status. Is it like ordinary campaign finance, in which case it could 
be regulated fairly extensively? Or is it like garden-variety political 
speech, rendering it presumptively unregulable? One argument for 
pairing quasi and regular campaign finance is that they share several 
features—who bankrolls them, the tactics they pay for, the reasons they 
work—and so may serve as substitutes. Another rationale for 
conflation is that they may both cause the same democratic injuries: 
corruption, the distortion of public opinion, and the misalignment of 
public policy. Pitted against these points is the slippery-slope objection: 
If quasi campaign finance may constitutionally be curbed, what 
political speech may not be? 
  Lastly, the Article suggests how quasi campaign finance should 
(assuming it actually may) be regulated. Limits on contributions and 
expenditures are unwise and probably unadministrable. Disclosure, 
though, is a necessity. The public should know who is trying to 
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persuade it (and how). Even more promising is the public 
subsidization of quasi campaign finance. If every voter received a 
voucher for this purpose, then public funds might crowd out private 
capital, thus alleviating its harmful effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On any given day—whether an election is imminent or not—
hundreds of Americans for Prosperity (“AFP”) activists knock on 
thousands of voters’ doors. Each encounter follows much the same 
script. The AFP activist pitches a message of small-government 
conservativism: lower taxes, less spending, less regulation, fewer 
entitlements, and so on. The AFP activist also asks for the voter’s views 
on a variety of topics and collects the voter’s contact information. This 
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data will be used in the future to encourage the voter to act in some 
way: to write to her representative, to attend a protest, to donate 
money, or to support a certain candidate.1 
AFP does more than proselytize on behalf of libertarianism. The 
organization also mobilizes the electorate around particular issues. 
When the Obama administration proposed a cap-and-trade policy to 
combat climate change, for example, AFP “sent ‘Carbon Cops,’ who 
pranced into Tea Party rallies pretending to be overreaching emissaries 
from the EPA.”2 AFP also “launched what it called the Cost of Hot 
Air Tour,” featuring “a seventy-foot-tall bright red hotair balloon on 
whose side was emblazoned a [derogatory] slogan.” 3  Likewise, 
whenever a state considers expanding Medicaid eligibility, the local 
AFP chapter springs into action. It runs “expensive ads decrying 
Medicaid expansion,” “organize[s] rallies and demonstrations,” and 
“canvasse[s] the districts of [legislators] who tried to compromise.”4 
These AFP efforts—as well as similar ones by many other 
groups—are notable in several respects. First, they are not explicitly 
electoral. They usually do not refer to candidates and may take place 
even when the next election is still far off. Second, the communications 
do have overt policy goals. They promote either a general ideology or 
a stance on a specific issue. And third, the mechanism through which 
the communications hope to achieve their policy goals is electoral. The 
idea is that politicians may be induced to behave in certain ways by 
voters’ nonelectoral mobilization because that nonelectoral energy 
could easily become electoral when the next campaign comes around. 
American law does not know what to make of this activity. 
Though it has an electoral connection, it is beyond the scope of 
campaign finance statutes. Those statutes apply only to 
communications that mention candidates in certain periods or that 
 
 1. See, e.g., Matea Gold, Americans for Prosperity Plows Millions into Building 
Conservative Ground Force, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/americans-for-prosperity-plows-millions-into-building-conservative-ground-force/2014/10/ 
06/692469b6-4b35-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_story.html [https://perma.cc/H9XJ-P642]; Michael J. 
Mishak & Philip Elliott, Americans for Prosperity Builds Political Machine, LEDGER (Oct. 11, 
2014, 10:46 PM), https://www.theledger.com/news/20141011/americans-for-prosperity-builds-
political-machine-for-2016-races/1 [https://perma.cc/NG6N-DP6R].  
 2. JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND 
THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 265–66 (2017). 
 3. Id. at 266.  
 4. Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol & Daniel Lynch, Business Associations, 
Conservative Networks, and the Ongoing Republican War over Medicaid Expansion, 41 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 239, 266 (2016) (describing the tactics of AFP-Virginia). 
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advocate their election or defeat.5 Nor do lobbying regulations extend 
to the activity, though it often involves requests that voters contact 
their representatives. Grassroots interactions with politicians, unlike 
direct lobbying, do not have to be disclosed.6 Tax law, too, fails to shed 
much light on the activity, though much of it is conducted by nonprofit 
groups that are required to file detailed returns.7 A series of loopholes 
render these returns only mildly informative.8 
My initial objective in this Article, then, is to introduce the concept 
of quasi campaign finance and to describe the little that is known about 
it. Quasi campaign finance, like conventional campaign finance, pays 
for political communications with voters. But with quasi campaign 
finance, unlike with ordinary campaign finance, these communications 
are nonelectoral yet rely on an electoral link to be effective. Little is 
known about quasi campaign finance because no law demands its 
disclosure. Individuals, corporations, unions, and nonprofits may thus 
fund quasi campaign finance without informing any authority of their 
disbursements. If “dark money” is electoral spending whose amount is 
known but whose source is not,9 then quasi campaign finance is even 
more opaque—black money whose sums and origins are mostly a 
mystery. 
Only mostly, though. Thanks to the dogged efforts of political 
scientists, we know a bit about the volume, drivers, and effects of quasi 
campaign finance. Its annual amount has been conservatively 
estimated at three quarters of a billion dollars; the true figure is likely 
somewhat higher.10 Quasi campaign finance is therefore in the same 
spending league as regular campaign finance and lobbying, which each 
total about $3 billion annually, but have commanded far more 
regulatory and scholarly attention. The biggest spenders on quasi 
campaign finance are wealthy and ideologically extreme individuals. 
AFP’s annual outlays of over $100 million, for instance, are funded by 
 
 5. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2018); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43–44 (1976) (per 
curiam).  
 6. See 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (2018). 
 7. See I.R.S. Schedule C (Form 990 or 990-EZ), Political Campaign and Lobbying Activities 
(OMB No. 1545-0047) (2019) [hereinafter Form 990 Schedule C], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f990sc.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ9S-EAML]. 
 8. See infra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.  
 9. See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Oct. 1, 2020), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php [https://perma.cc/3SD9-FVBH]. 
 10. See, e.g., Drew Dimmery & Andrew Peterson, Shining the Light on Dark Money: 
Political Spending by Nonprofits, 2 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 51, 64–65 (2016) 
[hereinafter Dimmery & Peterson, Shining the Light].  
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the Koch brothers and their affiliated right-wing network.11 And these 
spenders appear to see quasi campaign finance as a partial substitute 
for conventional campaign finance. When the latter is more heavily 
restricted, more money flows to the former, and vice versa.12 
Interestingly, quasi campaign finance does not seem to move 
public opinion significantly.13 This may be because its usual aim is to 
raise an issue’s salience, not to change voters’ minds. Or it may be 
because it typically targets a narrow slice of the electorate: older, better 
educated, and more affluent voters. 14  However, quasi campaign 
finance evidently does influence the behavior of elected officials. 15 
They may (wrongly) think that it is shifting voters’ views—and then 
alter their own positions to be more congruent with (what they believe 
to be) the electorate’s. Or politicians may (rightly) worry that any 
group that can mobilize the public around a nonelectoral issue can also 
do so come election time. After all, the same techniques characterize 
quasi and ordinary campaign finance; the main difference is the 
message.16 
The complex relationship between quasi and regular campaign 
finance motivates my second inquiry in this Article: probing whether, 
legally, quasi campaign finance is more like regular campaign finance 
or the vast domain of public discourse. A great deal hinges on the 
answer to this question. Conventional campaign finance may be 
regulated through disclosure requirements, contribution limits, and 
formerly—but maybe again if the Supreme Court’s composition 
changes—expenditure caps. This is because ordinary campaign finance 
is arguably part of the bounded institution of elections: a delimited area 
where the state may regulate speech to promote the institution’s ends. 
In contrast, public discourse is generally deemed unregulable under the 
First Amendment tradition. As Professor Robert Post has written, 
 
 11. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 1. 
 12. See, e.g., Robert E. Hogan, State Campaign Finance Laws and Interest Group 
Electioneering Activities, 67 J. POL. 887, 901 (2005).  
 13. See infra notes 144–53 and accompanying text.  
 14. See, e.g., KENNETH M. GOLDSTEIN, INTEREST GROUPS, LOBBYING, AND 
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 115–16 (1999).  
 15. See, e.g., Daniel E. Bergan, Does Grassroots Lobbying Work? A Field Experiment 
Measuring the Effects of an e-Mail Lobbying Campaign on Legislative Behavior, 37 AM. POL. 
RSCH. 327, 340 (2009) (“The models show that the e-mail lobbying campaign influenced legislative 
voting behavior on the two pivotal roll calls.”). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 329 (discussing the reasons why quasi campaign finance may influence 
legislators). 
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“[W]ithin public discourse, speech must be kept free in order 
democratically to determine what [society’s] goals should be.”17 
The contemporary Court would no doubt assign quasi campaign 
finance to the realm of public discourse. Indeed, the contemporary 
Court has edged ever closer to classifying regular campaign finance as 
public discourse—and thus obliterating any legal distinction between 
elections writ small and politics writ large. 18  Consistent with other 
scholarship,19 though, my premise here is that elections and politics do 
meaningfully differ: that the former may be structured and 
administered in ways that would be impermissible for the latter. If this 
premise is granted, then the legal status of quasi campaign finance 
becomes a difficult and fascinating issue. The law must then decide 
whether it fits better in the electoral domain (despite its nonelectoral 
content) or in public discourse (despite its reliance on future campaigns 
for its impact). 
From a functional perspective, this is not actually a dilemma. As 
no less an authority than Charles Koch has explained, quasi and 
conventional campaign finance serve the same ultimate purpose. 
“Education,” “grassroots organizations,” “lobbying,” and “political 
action” all aim “[t]o bring about social change,” and so constitute “a 
strategy that is vertically and horizontally integrated.”20 Yet the claim 
that quasi campaign finance is legally like ordinary campaign finance 
because a funder may substitute one activity for the other surely proves 
too much. For example, Charles Koch also advances his agenda 
through think tanks, university centers, and media organs.21 But no one 
would consider these entities to be part of the electoral domain. If they 
 
 17. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 81 (2014).  
 18. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 516 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“What separates issue advocacy and political advocacy is a line in the sand drawn on a windy 
day.” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 n.16 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010))). 
 19. See generally, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (distinguishing between elections specifically and politics generally); 
Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 
(1999) [hereinafter Briffault, Issue Advocacy] (same); Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and 
Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 789 (1998) (same); Frederick Schauer & 
Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803 
(1999) (same).  
 20. MAYER, supra note 2, at 173. 
 21. See generally MAYER, supra note 2 (discussing Koch’s multipronged initiatives); Theda 
Skocpol & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, The Koch Network and Republican Party Extremism, 
14 PERSP. ON POL. 681 (2016) (same).  
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could be labeled electoral due to their interchangeability with 
campaign finance, then little would remain of public discourse.  
Another argument for equating quasi and regular campaign 
finance is that they both may distort public opinion. For many years, 
the Court recognized “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense 
aggregations of wealth” on voters’ choices at the polls. 22  If those 
decisions can be distorted by conventional campaign finance, it stands 
to reason that voters’ policy stances can be skewed by quasi campaign 
finance. As noted above, however, there is an empirical problem with 
this proposition. Quasi campaign finance does not greatly sway public 
opinion.23 A deeper difficulty is that if quasi campaign finance may be 
regulated because of its effects on voters, then so may be any 
communications that are persuasive thanks to their heavy funding. The 
anti-distortion argument thus also imperils the special place of public 
discourse in First Amendment law. 
A further reason to treat quasi and ordinary campaign finance 
symmetrically is their impact on politicians (as opposed to voters). In 
previous work, I have shown that legislators’ records mirror their 
donors’ preferences but diverge widely from what their constituents 
want.24 Similarly, as observed earlier, quasi campaign finance exerts 
considerable influence on elected officials, inclining them toward the 
funders’ positions and away from the electorate’s.25 But the Court has 
never accepted the misalignment of representatives’ and voters’ views 
as a justification for curbing protected speech. One might also worry 
again about slippery slopes. If quasi campaign finance earns the same 
legal status as regular campaign finance because of its misaligning 
potential, then so might other political messages that threaten, too, to 
drive a wedge between politicians and their constituents. 
As this sketch illustrates, I am conflicted about the legal place of 
quasi campaign finance. For every analogy between it and 
conventional campaign finance, there is a counterpoint that, actually, 
it more closely resembles public discourse. Nevertheless, my final aim 
in this Article is to explore the regulatory implications if quasi and 
 
 22. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 319.  
 23. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 
1425, 1467–86 (2015) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance]. 
 25. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
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ordinary campaign finance were ultimately paired. In that case, how 
should quasi campaign finance be managed? 
The default tools of regular campaign finance law—limits on 
contributions and expenditures—seem inapt. In the quasi campaign 
finance context, there are no donations to candidates to restrict. 
Ceilings on spending would also face formidable issues of 
administrability: where to set the caps, how to deal with proliferating 
groups, which disbursements to count, and so on. Disclosure, however, 
is a more plausible option. At present, little is known about who pays 
for quasi campaign finance, how much money is spent, or where this 
money goes. If this data were produced, as it is for conventional 
campaign finance, then voters would learn which actors are trying to 
mobilize them and with what resources. This information could be even 
more useful to rival groups, who could offset the disclosed activities 
with renewed efforts of their own.  
But the most intriguing idea, in my view, is the public subsidization 
of quasi campaign finance. In particular, I envision a voucher program 
of the sort that scholars have long advocated,26 and municipalities have 
begun to implement,27 in the ordinary campaign finance arena. Under 
such a program, each voter would receive a small annual sum (say 
$100), which the voter could then spend directly on quasi-electoral 
activities or contribute to a group engaged in these efforts. The policy’s 
appeal is that it would significantly allay concerns about distortion and 
misalignment. If quasi campaign finance were largely paid for by the 
people themselves, it would push public opinion toward, not away 
from, a benchmark of free and equal participation. Likewise, it would 
motivate politicians to shift their positions in the direction of the 
electorate’s, since their humble constituents would now be the source 
of most quasi-electoral funding. 
The Article takes the following route. Part I is a descriptive 
account of quasi campaign finance. I define the term, provide more 
examples of it, and summarize what is known about its volume, drivers, 
and effects. Part II is then the Article’s legal core. I carefully consider 
the arguments for treating quasi and regular campaign finance 
equivalently, and, conversely, for assigning quasi campaign finance to 
the realm of public discourse. I also discuss other classificatory options, 
 
 26. See generally, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002) (advancing a voucher proposal). 
 27. See, e.g., Democracy Voucher Program, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/democracy 
voucher/about-the-program [https://perma.cc/SG5D-MHT2].  
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like situating quasi campaign finance in a bounded domain of 
policymaking. Lastly, Part III returns from theory to practice. I 
propose and assess a series of regulations that could be applied to quasi 
campaign finance—assuming it is, in fact, regulable.  
One more note before proceeding: because quasi campaign 
finance has not previously been studied in any depth, the approach of 
this Article is necessarily exploratory and contingent. I say as much as 
can fairly be said about the subject, given our current knowledge about 
it. But I hope that future research will expand and deepen what we 
know about nonelectoral, yet still political, messages to voters. And as 
our understanding shifts, so, I expect, will my descriptive and 
normative claims about quasi campaign finance. These claims are 
preliminary, at present, not set in stone.  
I.  THE CONTOURS OF QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
Judge Richard Posner once referred to certain companies as 
“political hermaphrodites” because of their penchant for donating 
money to candidates from both major parties. 28  Quasi campaign 
finance is also politically hermaphroditic, albeit for a different reason. 
It straddles not the partisan line between Democrats and Republicans 
but rather the conceptual boundary between elections and politics. My 
goal in this Part, then, is to gain some theoretical and empirical 
purchase on this hybrid activity. I first define quasi campaign finance 
as funding for communications with voters that are nonelectoral yet rely 
on an electoral mechanism to be effective. After showing how this 
definition distinguishes quasi campaign finance from existing legal 
categories, I describe several more cases of it. AFP and other Koch-
backed groups are today’s highest-profile funders of quasi-electoral 
communications, though wealthy liberal individuals and organizations 
are now also entering the fray. 
In the balance of the Part, I scour the academic literature—of 
which surprisingly little is relevant—and present its findings about the 
scale, causes, and consequences of quasi campaign finance. As to its 
scale, it is comparable to, if somewhat less voluminous than, 
conventional campaign finance. As to its causes, more money flows 
into quasi campaign finance when ordinary electoral funding is limited, 
when issues are salient, and when groups seek to disrupt the status quo. 
And as to its consequences, quasi campaign finance appears to have a 
 
 28. LaFalce v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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greater impact on elected officials than on voters. It induces politicians 
to move in the funders’ preferred direction, while it stimulates but 
seldom convinces the public. 
A. Definition 
Several pieces of my definition for quasi campaign finance require 
explication.29 Start with the first word: funding. In the regular campaign 
finance context, the focus is on the money that is deployed in elections, 
not the messages the money is used to disseminate.30 This is because it 
is the money that may give rise to corruption, distortion, misalignment, 
and other democratic harms. The messages, in contrast, are simply 
political speech, which legally may not31 (and normatively should not32) 
be regulated on account of its viewpoint. So, too, in the arena of quasi 
campaign finance. If this activity is problematic, it is because of the 
resources that are dedicated to it, not the ideas that are propagated by 
those resources. The ideas, again, are political advocacy that any 
democracy should cherish. Accordingly, my definition emphasizes the 
funding of nonelectoral communications, as does my subsequent 
analysis.33 
 
 29. The literature includes a few other definitional efforts, none of which are quite right, in 
my view. See, e.g., KEN KOLLMAN, OUTSIDE LOBBYING: PUBLIC OPINION & INTEREST GROUP 
STRATEGIES 3 (1998) (defining “outside lobbying” as “attempts by interest group leaders to 
mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure public officials 
inside the policymaking community” (emphasis omitted)); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY 
VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND 
THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 400 (2012) [hereinafter SCHLOZMAN ET AL., 
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS] (defining “grassroots lobbying” as “communicating with the public or 
with organization members and supporters in order to highlight issues, to shape opinions, or to 
generate communications to public officials in support of favored political positions”); Pam 
Fielding, A Guide to Grassroots Advocacy for Lobbyists, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL 769, 770 
(William V. Luneburg, Thomas M. Susman & Rebecca H. Gordon eds., 4th ed. 2009) 
(“Grassroots lobbying is any formal or informal effort designed to influence policymakers or 
policymaking by mobilizing the general public (or a segment of the general public) to support or 
oppose a particular position on an issue.”).  
 30. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (analyzing “the giving and 
spending of money” rather than the “forms of communication made possible by [it]”). 
 31. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“When the government targets . . . particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation 
of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”). 
 32. I share Alexander Meiklejohn’s view that “no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no 
counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept” from the people. ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 89 (1948). 
 33. See infra Parts II–III. 
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These communications with voters may take the same forms as 
electoral messages. They may thus include television and online 
advertisements, fundraising solicitations, door-to-door canvassing, 
phone banking, speeches, rallies, and protests. The only requirement is 
that there be some provision of information from the payor of the quasi 
campaign finance to the electorate. That the electorate is the audience 
for the communications is important as well. My definition is only 
intended to capture efforts at mass mobilization and persuasion. It is 
not meant to extend to messages conveyed directly to elites, such as 
politicians, bureaucrats, journalists, and scholars.34  
This brings me to the first of the two distinguishing characteristics 
of quasi campaign finance: the nonelectoral nature of the 
communications with voters. They do not openly urge the election or 
defeat of any candidate. Indeed, they often do not even mention any 
candidate’s name. The messages may also be sent at any time, whether 
an election is imminent or still years away. If anything, their schedule 
is more closely tied to ongoing policy debates than to the electoral 
calendar. Nevertheless, the communications are necessarily political. 
Their subject may be an overarching ideology like libertarianism, 
religious fundamentalism, environmentalism, or socialism. Or they 
may tackle a particular issue like taxes, abortion, climate change, or 
welfare. In either case, the messages provide the recipients with 
information, argue for certain positions, and sometimes request that 
the recipients take actions. These steps could be supplying contact 
details, writing to representatives, giving money, or volunteering for 
future activities. 
The other essential attribute of quasi campaign finance is its 
reliance on an electoral mechanism to be effective. This mechanism is 
quite blunt for certain communications. Though their content is 
nonelectoral, their primary purpose is to elect or defeat specific 
candidates. The messages only take a nonelectoral form because their 
funders have decided, for legal or strategic reasons, that this approach 
is preferable to an overtly electoral effort. The mechanism is subtler, 
however, for other communications. Their aim truly is policy change 
(or preservation), not returning candidates to (or ousting them from) 
office. The broadcasters of these messages may even be agnostic as to 
who is elected as long as their policy priorities are achieved. Yet these 
activities, too, depend on an electoral connection for their efficacy.  
 
 34. I want to emphasize the word “directly” in this definition. Quasi campaign finance 
certainly intends to convey messages indirectly to elites through the activities of mobilized voters. 
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Actually, they depend on several related links. Perhaps the most 
obvious is the threat of future electoral mobilization. A group that is 
able to reach many voters with nonelectoral communications could 
likely do the same—only with electoral messages—during the next 
campaign. The group could use exactly the same tactics but switch their 
mode from nonelectoral to electoral advocacy. Knowing this, election-
seeking politicians may be inclined to do what the group wants: to 
support (or oppose) the group’s preferred (or disfavored) policies. 
That way, the politicians may avoid a large-scale effort being launched 
against them close to the next election—or benefit from a major 
mobilization on their own behalf.35 
Another pathway hinges not on a group’s future electoral 
activities but rather on the cogency of its current nonelectoral 
communications. Suppose that a group’s quasi campaign finance 
convinces some voters to shift their positions on a given issue. These 
may be ordinary voters whose only resources are their ballots; or they 
may be more influential constituents thanks to their campaign 
contributions, political connections, and activism. This change in public 
opinion may induce politicians to adjust their own stances in the same 
direction. Some politicians may adhere to a delegate theory of 
representation, under which they ought to reflect faithfully their 
voters’ views. Less high-mindedly, other politicians may worry that if 
they are not responsive to their constituents’ preferences, they may 
face an electoral penalty. Ordinary voters who find that candidates do 
not share their positions may vote against them on election day. Even 
worse, more influential constituents who are at odds with candidates 
may offer their time, money, and networks to opposing politicians.36 
A final route through which quasi campaign finance may have an 
electoral impact is a variant of the previous one. Even if nonelectoral 
messages do not persuade voters, they may raise the salience of certain 
 
 35. For other scholars noting this mechanism, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 39 (“[I]f 
[groups] can recruit citizens to write about an issue, they can recruit citizens to vote on an issue.”) 
and Bergan, supra note 15, at 329 (“[T]his method can signal to legislators that groups are able to 
mobilize supporters, and may be able to do so in the next election, giving the legislator an 
incentive to support the groups’ preferred policies.”). 
 36. For other scholars noting this mechanism, see KOLLMAN, supra note 29, at 8 (explaining 
that “outside lobbying” may “influence public opinion by changing how selected constituents 
consider and respond to policy issues”) and ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT 
LOBBYISTS WANT (AND HOW THEY TRY TO GET IT) 79 (2006) (“The influence of constituent 
opinion on the behavior of elected officials—especially legislators—cannot be overestimated.”). 
Note that if quasi campaign finance exerts its influence because elected officials think of 
themselves as delegates, that is a nonelectoral mechanism.  
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issues and educate voters as to how their representatives have 
addressed those issues. This is a more modest role for quasi campaign 
finance, requiring only that it not be ignored by its audience. Yet it 
could create much the same incentive for politicians to endorse the 
policies favored by the funders of the nonelectoral communications. If 
they fail to do so, after all, they could risk electoral retribution from 
voters newly attentive to a topic and newly aware of what candidates 
are saying (or not saying) about it.37  
B. Demarcation 
So defined, quasi campaign finance is mostly exempt from (1) 
conventional campaign finance regulation; (2) lobbying law; and (3) 
the tax code. In the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme 
Court held that the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”)—the 
1974 law that established the modern framework of campaign finance 
regulation—applies only to “communications that include explicit 
words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate.” 38  Quasi 
campaign finance is thus entirely uncovered by FECA since one of its 
hallmarks is that it does not pay for messages that overtly urge a 
candidate’s election or defeat. Consequently, under FECA, quasi 
campaign finance is not limited in any way, nor does it have to be 
disclosed to the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). 
The story is similar, if not quite identical, under the other key 
federal campaign finance statute: the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (“BCRA”). BCRA created a new category of 
“electioneering communication” that includes “any broadcast, cable, 
or satellite communication” that “refers to a clearly identified 
candidate” and is made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of 
a general election.39 Most quasi campaign finance is not electioneering 
 
 37. For other scholars noting this mechanism, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 34 
(observing that “[g]rass roots lobbying” may “make policy effects more salient,” “make 
constituents aware of government actions,” and “link legislators to those policy effects and 
government actions”) and Bergan, supra note 15, at 329 (“[G]rassroots lobbying campaigns 
simultaneously inform group members of the actions that a legislator is taking on an issue (such 
as legislative votes) and let legislators know that group members are informed and paying 
attention to legislative actions.”). 
 38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 43 (1976) (per curiam). On its face, the statute extended to 
communications “relative to a clearly identified candidate,” id. at 39 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 608(e)(1) (1790 ed., Supp. IV), but the Court adopted a narrowing construction in order to 
“preserve the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds,” id. at 44.  
 39. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A) (2018). BCRA’s prohibition of corporation and union 
electioneering communication was upheld in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003), but 
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communication. The messages it pays for typically are not television 
ads, or do not mention a candidate, or are not disseminated close 
enough to an election. A fraction of quasi campaign finance, however, 
is regulated by BCRA. Take a television ad, aired near an election, that 
mostly discusses a certain policy but closes by asking viewers to contact 
a candidate about that issue. Even though the ad is nonelectoral 
(otherwise it would not be quasi campaign finance), BCRA requires 
the disclosure of its content and funding to the FEC.40 
Beyond being subject to disclosure, the hypothetical ad is notable 
in another respect: not only is it not express advocacy, it is not “sham” 
issue advocacy either. Sham issue advocacy is a pejorative term for 
communications that avoid the “magic words” of overt electoral 
support or opposition—which would bring them within FECA’s 
scope—but that are obviously aimed at influencing voters’ choices at 
the polls. 41  The ad does not resort to this sort of subterfuge. By 
assumption, it addresses a matter of policy, providing information to 
its audience and endorsing a particular stance. It refers to a candidate 
not to recommend her election or defeat, but rather to make clear 
whom voters may contact to express their views on the topic. The ad is 
thus true rather than sham issue advocacy: a genuinely policy-focused 
and nonelectoral communication. This is the case, moreover, for all 
quasi campaign finance. Indeed, the activity could equivalently be 
labeled as that portion of true issue advocacy that relies on an electoral 
mechanism to be effective.42 
 
invalidated in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–19, 366 (2010). However, Citizens United 
upheld BCRA’s disclosure requirement for electioneering communication. See Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 366–71. 
 40. See § 30104(f) (specifying BCRA’s disclosure requirements for electioneering 
communication).  
 41. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 185 (discussing the “proliferation of sham issue ads” in 
the late 1990s); see also Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence To 
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1795 (2001) (finding in an empirical study that the “vast majority” of 
electioneering communication that is not express advocacy is sham issue advocacy). A classic 
example of this sham issue advocacy was a commercial detailing domestic violence perpetrated 
by a candidate, his felony conviction, and his failure to pay child support, and concluding, “Call 
Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family values.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193 n.78.  
 42. As noted above, the primary subjective motivation of some quasi campaign finance may 
be electoral. See supra Part I.A. To qualify as quasi campaign finance (rather than as sham issue 
advocacy), however, its content must be nonelectoral. This obviously raises the question of how 
to distinguish between electoral and nonelectoral material. I do not provide an answer here (at 
least not beyond those supplied by FECA and BCRA) for two reasons. First, as discussed below, 
the heartland of quasi campaign finance is plainly nonelectoral and thus avoids this quandary. See 
infra Part I.C. Second, the distinction between electoral and nonelectoral content seems less 
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Another body of law that might be thought applicable to quasi 
campaign finance—but, in fact, is not—is lobbying regulation. The 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (“LDA”) requires the quarterly 
reporting of “lobbying contacts,” which are “oral or written 
communication[s]” with executive or legislative branch officials about 
policy matters.43 Since some quasi campaign finance encourages voters 
to make such communications, the resulting grassroots contacts may 
seem like they would be covered by the LDA. However, the statute 
exempts messages that are broadcast through a “medium of mass 
communication,” which is precisely how quasi campaign finance often 
reaches the electorate. 44  More importantly, the LDA’s legislative 
history makes clear that it does not mandate the disclosure of so-called 
“grassroots lobbying”: contacts between ordinary voters and elected 
officials. As the law’s sponsor stated on the Senate floor, “We struck 
any reference to grassroots lobbying from the lobbying reform bill . . . 
in order to make progress.”45 
Though it need not be reported under the LDA, grassroots 
lobbying has an interesting relationship with quasi campaign finance. 
A common goal of quasi campaign finance is to stimulate grassroots 
lobbying: to convince voters to contact their representatives about the 
issues that are the subject of the funders’ communications. This 
lobbying may be effective simply because some politicians are 
responsive to their constituents, irrespective of any electoral 
 
important to me than the boundary between quasi campaign finance and public discourse. If the 
claim is correct that quasi campaign finance may be conflated for legal purposes with conventional 
campaign finance, then the line between them is largely immaterial. Communications may still be 
regulated no matter on which side of the line they fall. In contrast, the border between quasi 
campaign finance and public discourse then becomes a cliff. That becomes the frontier beyond 
which regulation is almost categorically impermissible. See infra Part II. 
 43. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A) (2018). More specifically, 
lobbying contacts must be with certain “covered” officials and must pertain to federal legislation, 
federal regulation, the administration of a federal program, or the nomination of a federal official. 
See id. Registered lobbyists must file quarterly reports stating the clients and issues they lobbied 
for, as well as the income they received for these activities. See id. § 1604(b).  
 44. Id. § 1602(8)(B)(iii). Even without this exemption, communications paid for by quasi 
campaign finance would not have to be disclosed (even if they encourage grassroots contacts) 
because they are directed at voters, not officials covered by the LDA. Id. § 1602(3)–(4). 
 45. 141 CONG. REC. 29,015 (1995) (statement of Sen. Levin); see also, e.g., Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group-Based, Approach to Lobbying Regulation, 
58 ALA. L. REV. 513, 529–30, 529 n.75 (2007) (“Because of the vociferous opposition to such 
regulation, the final version of the LDA passed in 1995 contains no regulation of grassroots 
lobbying.”). However, “most state lobbying disclosure laws do cover some grassroots lobbying 
activity.” Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 
ELECTION L.J. 160, 187 (2014) [hereinafter Briffault, Anxiety] (emphasis added). 
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implications. Or the grassroots contacts may have an impact because 
other politicians realize that voters motivated enough to reach out to 
them about policy matters may easily organize for or against them 
during the next campaign. In the latter case, grassroots lobbying has an 
electoral valence, and indeed constitutes one of the electoral 
mechanisms through which quasi campaign finance achieves its aims.46 
Tax law is the final field that is potentially relevant to quasi 
campaign finance. A good deal of the activity is conducted by nonprofit 
groups that are registered under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code: social welfare organizations (501(c)(4)s), labor unions 
(501(c)(5)s), and business leagues (501(c)(6)s).47 All of these groups 
must file tax returns that are public and that detail their revenue, 
expenses, and assets.48 The tax returns also include questions about 
“direct and indirect political campaign activities,” “lobbying 
expenditures to influence public opinion (grassroots lobbying),” and 
“lobbying expenditures to influence a legislative body (direct 
lobbying).”49 
But the tax returns do not ultimately provide the disclosure that 
conventional campaign finance law and lobbying law fail to require. 
The expenses that groups list are broken down by function: 
“compensation,” “occupancy,” “travel,” and the like.50  There is no 
separate category for nonelectoral, yet still political, messages to 
voters. In addition, the tax returns’ reference to “direct and indirect 
political campaign activities” captures only electoral efforts—
conventional rather than quasi campaign finance.51 And the questions 
about “grassroots lobbying” and “direct lobbying” 52  have to be 
answered only by 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in lobbying.53 
 
 46. Grassroots lobbying may also play a part in the other electoral mechanisms discussed 
above. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. That is, it may suggest to politicians that 
voters’ preferences have changed, that the salience of certain issues has increased, or that 
politicians’ own positions are better known to the electorate. 
 47. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2018).  
 48. See I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-
0047) (2019) [hereinafter Form 990], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EUP6-G8D8]. 
 49. Form 990 Schedule C, supra note 7, at pt. I-A, II-A. 
 50. Form 990, supra note 48, at pt. IX. 
 51. Form 990 Schedule C, supra note 7, at pt. I-A. 
 52. Id. at pt. II-A. 
 53. See Form 990, supra note 48, at pt. IV (“Section 501(c)(3) organizations. Did the 
organization engage in lobbying activities . . . ? If ‘Yes,’ complete Schedule C, Part II.” (first 
emphasis omitted)).  
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Other nonprofit groups may ignore these questions. In fact, as long as 
they do not receive membership dues, other groups need not supply 
any information at all about their nonelectoral activities—lobbying or 
otherwise.54 
C. Examples 
Quasi campaign finance, then, is money that pays for 
communications with voters that are not about elections but that 
nevertheless depend on an electoral link for their effectiveness. Quasi 
campaign finance is also mostly unregulated by the bodies of law that 
apply to ordinary campaign finance, lobbying, and taxation. But 
moving beyond these initial points, what does quasi campaign finance 
actually look like? On the ground, which actors use which tactics to 
address which issues? 
I cannot provide a full answer here, due to both space constraints 
and the lack of disclosure of most nonelectoral, yet still political, 
activities. I can, however, offer a number of examples of quasi 
campaign finance, gleaned from the work of many journalists and a few 
enterprising political scientists. These examples, of course, are not 
necessarily representative. They may be, but it is impossible to say for 
sure since the relevant universe is shrouded in uncertainty. Still, the 
examples suggest that quasi campaign finance is often paid for by 
wealthy individuals who are involved in electoral as well as 
nonelectoral politics; that its techniques closely resemble those of 
electoral campaigns; and that its topics tend to be controversial areas 
of ongoing public debate. 
I began this Article with a synopsis of the nonelectoral efforts of 
Americans for Prosperity: canvassing voters to spread a libertarian 
message, organizing rallies to oppose the Obama administration’s cap-
and-trade proposal, running ads against politicians considering 
 
 54. See id. (“Is the organization a section 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), or 501(c)(6) organization that 
receives membership dues . . . ? If ‘Yes,’ complete Schedule C, Part III.”). In its most recent 
publicly available tax return, for example, AFP reported total expenses of $51.7 million as well as 
$2.9 million of electoral spending. Ams. for Prosperity Found., Form 990, Return of Organization 
Exempt from Income Tax 1 (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/
nonprofits/display_990/521527294/02_2019_prefixes_47-52%2F521527294_201712_990_2019022716130818  
[https://perma.cc/8HJ8-ZJL9]; Ams. for Prosperity Found., Form 990 Schedule C, Political Campaign 
and Lobbying Activities 1 (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/Nonprofits/ 
display_990/521527294/02_2019_prefixes_47-52%2F521527294_201712_990_2019022716130818  
[https://perma.cc/8HJ8-ZJL9]. But because AFP is a nonmembership 501(c)(4) organization, it 
did not say a word about its lobbying or other nonelectoral activities.  
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Medicaid expansion, and so on. 55  I chose AFP as an introductory 
example because it appears to be the single biggest spender on quasi 
campaign finance in contemporary American politics. Surveying AFP 
tax returns and archived AFP web pages, political scientists Theda 
Skocpol and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez found that the group’s 
annual budget increased from $4 million in 2005 to $150 million in 2015, 
its staff rose from nineteen to five hundred full-time employees, and its 
volunteer activists grew from two hundred thousand to 2.4 million.56 
AFP’s funds are supplied by the Koch brothers and their affiliated 
network of conservative donors.57 They are deployed for not only quasi 
campaign finance but also regular campaign finance and lobbying.58 
And in their sheer scale, they make AFP “a privatized political and 
policy advocacy operation like no other in American history,” with 
capabilities that rival those of the Republican Party itself.59 
AFP uses these vast resources to advance a range of policies 
beyond the ones noted at the Article’s outset.60 At the federal level, for 
instance, AFP launched a “Porkulus” effort against the Obama 
administration’s stimulus package,61 fought the passage and then the 
implementation of Obamacare, 62  initiated the “Spending 
 
 55. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 687; see also, e.g., Henry Farrell, 
Alexander Hertel-Fernandez & Theda Skocpol, Trump Will Win or Lose. Either Way, the Koch 
Network Will Still Shape the Republican Party, WASH. POST (Feb. 29, 2016, 8:45 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/29/trump-may-win-or-lose-either- 
way-the-koch-network-will-still-shape-the-republican-party [https://perma.cc/LL5B-9YY3] (reporting 
that “Koch donors gave close to $400 million leading into 2012 and [had] pledged to spend 
between $700 and $900 million for the 2015–16 cycle”). 
 57. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Inside the Vast Liberal Conspiracy, POLITICO (June 23, 2014, 
5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/inside-the-vast-liberal-conspiracy-108171 [https:// 
perma.cc/S4SM-N5FD] (“Koch network donors are expected to provide almost every penny of 
the Koch operation’s . . . spending goal[s].”). 
 58. See, e.g., Farrell, Hertel-Fernandez & Skocpol, supra note 56 (“[AFP] mov[es] seamlessly 
from helping to elect very conservative Republicans to lobbying them once in office to effectuate 
preferred policies.”). 
 59. Kenneth P. Vogel, How the Koch Network Rivals the GOP, POLITICO (Dec. 30, 2015, 
5:17 AM) [hereinafter Vogel, Koch Network], https://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/koch-
brothers-network-gop-david-charles-217124 [https://perma.cc/E4CG-V2S5]; see also, e.g., 
Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 689 (commenting that AFP “more closely 
resembles a European-style political party than any sort of specialized traditional U.S. advocacy 
group or election campaign organization”). 
 60. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
 61. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 2, at 209.  
 62. See, e.g., id. at 237. 
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Accountability Project” in support of automatic spending reductions,63 
and backed the Trump administration’s tax cuts. 64  In the states, 
similarly, AFP “focus[es] relentlessly on promoting tax cuts, blocking 
and eliminating business regulations, opposing the landmark health-
reform law passed in 2010, pushing for reductions in funding of (and, 
where possible, the privatization of) public education and social-
welfare programs, and opposing state-level environmental 
initiatives.” 65  AFP pursues these aims through the same means as 
campaigns for elected office. It holds rallies, including more than three 
hundred against Obamacare.66 It broadcasts ads, like its attacks on 
politicians contemplating Medicaid expansion.67 And its hundreds of 
employees and thousands of volunteers represent “a permanent 
ground force” that never stops calling and canvassing voters, even 
outside the electoral season.68 As one of AFP’s regional directors told 
his staff, “If you think you’re having fun now, just wait until after the 
election, because then you’ll start to see the fear in these legislators’ 
eyes—‘Oh wait, AFP’s not leaving?’”69 
While AFP is the Koch brothers’ flagship organization, it is only a 
part of a broader constellation of Koch-backed groups that engage in 
significant nonelectoral activities. Unlike the generalist AFP, these 
other groups target specific constituencies with the Kochs’ small-
government ideology. Generation Opportunity appeals to college-
aged voters, the LIBRE Initiative is directed at Latinos, the 60 Plus 
Association reaches out to senior citizens, and so on.70 Despite their 
 
 63. See, e.g., T.W. Farnam, Americans for Prosperity Campaigns To Let the Sequester Take 
Effect in March, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2013) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
americans-for-prosperity-campaigns-to-let-the-sequester-take-effect-in-march/2013/02/14/
fa339670-76cf-11e2-95e4-6148e45d7adb_story.html [https://perma.cc/LFD7-LY56].  
 64. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative Groups Seeking Support for Tax Cuts Find it a 
Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2AXyiOO [https://perma.cc/GA6C-U8QC]. 
 65. Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 690; see also, e.g., Farrell, Hertel-
Fernandez & Skocpol, supra note 56 (describing AFP efforts “to block Medicaid expansion in the 
states, weaken public sector labor unions, stop environmental and climate change reforms, and 
limit government spending”). 
 66. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 2, at 237. 
 67. See, e.g., Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol & Lynch, supra note 4, at 274. 
 68. Gold, supra note 1. 
 69. Id.; see also, e.g., Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 689 (“In another 
distinctive combination, Americans for Prosperity conducts political activities between as well as 
during elections, maintaining a continuity of effort that its leaders proudly tout . . . .”). 
 70. See, e.g., Vogel, Koch Network, supra note 59. Other Koch-backed groups targeting 
specific constituencies include the Concerned Women for America and the Concerned Veterans 
for America. Id. After years of separate existence, these groups were recently relocated within 
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narrower audiences, these groups push the same policies, and rely on 
the same tactics as AFP. Generation Opportunity thus runs ads against 
Obamacare (featuring a “creepy Uncle Sam”) and throws tailgate 
parties where attendees are urged not to purchase health insurance.71 
The LIBRE Initiative provides services like English-language classes, 
resume-writing assistance, and free Thanksgiving turkeys; in return, 
beneficiaries have to provide their contact information and listen to 
LIBRE’s libertarian pitch.72 And the 60 Plus Association promotes the 
privatization of Social Security through bus tours, rallies, and 
commercials, especially in senior-rich Florida.73 
Of course, quasi campaign finance is not the exclusive province of 
the Koch network. On the left, hedge fund billionaire Tom Steyer has 
founded a pair of organizations, NextGen America and Need to 
Impeach, that are dedicated to combating climate change and 
impeaching President Trump, respectively. 74  Between them, these 
groups have close to a thousand employees and biannual outlays of 
over $100 million (though most of these resources seem to be allocated 
to electoral activities).75 The groups’ nonelectoral efforts include town 
halls, petition drives, door-to-door canvassing, and ad campaigns about 
 
AFP itself. See James Hohmann, The Daily 202: The Koch Network Is Reorganizing Under a New 




 71. See, e.g., Ashley Alman, Creepy Uncle Sam Parties with College Students To Slam 
Obamacare, HUFFPOST (Nov. 12, 2013, 11:19 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/creepy-uncle-
sam-obamacare_n_4260116 [https://perma.cc/MAN5-2EB4]; Garance Franke-Ruta, Creepy Anti-
Obamacare Ads Suggest Where Uncle Sam Wants To Stick It, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/creepy-anti-obamacare-ads-suggest-where-
uncle-sam-wants-to-stick-it/279825 [https://perma.cc/UG2P-ECRU]. 
 72. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, As Influx of Puerto Ricans Continues, Koch-Based Group Starts 
Seeking Them Out in Florida, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/01/08/as-influx-of-puerto-ricans-continues-koch-backed-group-starts- 
seeking-them-out-in-florida [https://perma.cc/4VTR-XXJK]; Ashley Parker, Koch Brothers Woo 
Hispanic Voters with Turkeys and Questionnaires, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015), 
https://nyti.ms/1Yv8koC [https://perma.cc/8M8V-XNLQ]. 
 73. See, e.g., Jeremy Wallace, AARP Rivals Launch Bus Tour in Sarasota, SARASOTA 
HERALD TRIB. (June 20, 2012), http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2012/06/20/aarp-rivals-launch-
bus-tour-in-sarasota [https://perma.cc/Y3ZJ-NAFC]; Medicare Tall Tales, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Dec. 7, 2009), https://www.tampabay.com/archive/2009/12/07/medicare-tall-tales [https://
perma.cc/DtE2-X2DS]. 
 74. See, e.g., Edward-Isaac Dovere, Tom Steyer’s $110 Million Plan To Redefine the 
Democrats, POLITICO (July 31, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/31/steyer-
democrats-millions-midterms-751245 [https://perma.cc/6B89-4HEF]. 
 75. Id. 
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the environment and impeachment. 76  Likewise, media billionaire 
Michael Bloomberg has launched two organizations, Partnership for a 
New American Economy and Mayors Against Illegal Guns, that aim, 
in turn, to enact immigration reform and to restrict access to guns.77 
Both groups have unleashed ad blitzes at times when congressional 
action looked feasible and built grassroots networks to reach voters 
and encourage them to contact their representatives.78 
Beyond wealthy individuals, labor unions have long been major 
spenders on quasi campaign finance on behalf of liberal causes. In 
recent years, the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) 
has set aside as much as $10 million for calling members of Congress, 
after elections are over, and pressing them on health care and other 
issues.79 The SEIU has also staged protests and conducted door-to-
door canvassing to fight anti-union proposals in several states.80 The 
AFL-CIO has begun a program called “Working America” as well, 
with canvassing offices across the country and an emphasis on “year-
round mobilization and education.” 81  In earlier periods, labor’s 
nonelectoral activities were even more widespread, creating an 
“‘anchoring’ relationship” between it and the Democratic Party that 
“pull[ed] the [Democrats] to the left on economic issues.” 82  The 
 
 76. See, e.g., Monica Hesse, Want To Impeach the President?, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2018, 
6:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/want-to-impeach-the-president-this-
billionaire-is-on-the-case/2018/03/26/da7d0fdc-2d13-11e8-8688-e053ba58f1e4_story.html [https://
perma.cc/GBU8-XN3J]; Alicia Mundy, Billionaire’s Climate Group Targets Seven Elections, 
WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2014, 1:20 AM), http://on.wsj.com/1krc3kB [https://perma.cc/DBC7-
YN8Y]. 
 77. See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Bloomberg’s TV Blitz on Guns Puts Swing Senators on the 
Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), https://nyti.ms/Y6FSMY [https://perma.cc/A5NG-T6M9]; 
Anna Palmer, Maggie Haberman & John Bresnahan, Bloomberg’s D.C. Footprint Explodes, 
POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2013, 2:06 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/bloomberg-
washington-footprint-086874 [https://perma.cc/4T3Q-8MJ7]; Anna Palmer, Immigration Groups 
To Target GOP, POLITICO (July 31, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2013/07/immigration-groups-target-house-gop-094949 [https://perma.cc/L895-KDEU] 
 78. See Barbaro, supra note 77; Palmer, Haberman & Bresnahan, supra note 77; Palmer, 
supra note 77.  
 79. Kris Maher, SEIU Plans to Spend Big on Its Agenda, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2009, 12:01 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123137926891763113?st=jeabkop6l3etjth [https://perma.cc/
46KK-HFVE].  
 80. See, e.g., Ben Smith, New Labor Plan: Nationwide Protests, POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2011,  
2:31 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2011/04/new-labor-plan-nationwide-protests-053547 
[https://perma.cc/56CL-T6EA].  
 81. Amy Dean, Is “Working America” the Way Forward?, 21 NEW LAB. F. 60, 63 (2012). 
 82. Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 690; see generally DANIEL SCHLOZMAN, 
WHEN MOVEMENTS ANCHOR PARTIES (2015) (discussing the anchoring function of unions for 
the Democratic Party). 
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Supreme Court acknowledged labor’s voluminous investment in 
midcentury quasi campaign finance in the 1957 case of United States v. 
UAW. 83  One union, the Court noted, had “an annual budget for 
‘educational’ work approximating $1,500,000” and “supplie[d] over 
500 radio stations with ‘briefs for broadcasters.’” 84  Another union, 
“with an annual budget of over $300,000 for political ‘education,’ ha[d] 
distributed some 80,000,000 pieces of literature.”85 
The Court discussed business-backed quasi campaign finance, too, 
in the 1961 case of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc.86 Trucking and railroad companies in Pennsylvania 
each sought the enactment of legislation that would benefit their sector 
and undercut the competition.87 The truckers thus “wrote to and made 
personal contacts with legislators in support of bills increasing the 
weight of trucks,” and encouraged other parties to “make personal 
contacts with legislators in Harrisburg without disclosing trucker 
connections.”88 Not to be outdone, the railroads “utilized the so-called 
third-party technique,” by which “the publicity matter circulated in the 
campaign was made to appear as spontaneously expressed views of 
independent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it was largely 
prepared and . . . paid for by the railroads.”89 In sum, the truckers and 
the railroads each “utilized all the political powers [they] could muster 
in an attempt to bring about the passage of laws that would help [one 
sector] or injure the other.”90 
 
 83. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 579–80 (1957). 
 84. Id. at 580–81. 
 85. Id. at 581. On the merits, the Court held that union spending on conventional campaign 
finance—specifically, “television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select certain 
candidates for Congress”—violated federal law. Id. at 585. 
 86. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 87. Id. at 127, 132.  
 88. Id. at 141 n.22 (quoting Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. R.R. Presidents Conf., 155 F. 
Supp. 768, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1957)).  
 89. Id. at 129–30. 
 90. Id. at 145. On the merits, the Court held that none of these activities violated the 
Sherman Act. See id. at 135–45. Antitrust law thus also does not reach quasi campaign finance. 
For other examples of historical quasi campaign finance, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 22–
23, discussing the efforts of the Anti-Saloon League to enact Prohibition and of the American 
Cotton Manufacturers Institute to levy protectionist tariffs; and see generally ISAAC WILLIAM 
MARTIN, RICH PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS TO UNTAX THE ONE 
PERCENT (2013), surveying mass movements aimed at cutting taxes for the wealthy. 
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D. Volume 
There are many examples of quasi campaign finance, then, 
spanning many funders and many years. In fact, it is probably fair to 
say that American politics is unthinkable without quasi campaign 
finance—without, that is, efforts to communicate with voters about 
nonelectoral matters while still depending on electoral connections. 
But the above examples are just that: a series of anecdotes that cannot 
reveal the overall landscape of quasi campaign finance. What is the 
shape of this terrain when it is surveyed systematically rather than 
piecemeal? How much money is spent on quasi campaign finance, and 
by whom? What causes this spending to rise or fall? What effects does 
the spending have on voters, on politicians, and on American 
democracy as a whole? 
The unfortunate truth is that it is hard to say. Because neither 
conventional campaign finance law, nor lobbying law, nor tax law 
requires the disclosure of quasi campaign finance, no comprehensive 
record exists of its sources, amounts, or uses. In this Section and the 
two that follow, I must therefore rely on a series of inadequate studies 
to describe the contours of quasi campaign finance. These studies are 
better than nothing; they give us a glimpse, at least, of the true role of 
nonelectoral, yet still political, activities. But the studies are also 
limited in many ways, which I flag as I go through them in order to be 
candid about how little is currently known.91 
To start, there are four kinds of potential spenders on quasi 
campaign finance: individuals, for-profit entities, nonprofit entities, 
and political entities. There is simply no information about the relevant 
efforts of individuals, for-profit entities, or political entities. These 
efforts do not have to be disclosed, nor has any academic work 
attempted to estimate them. However, there is reason to think they 
might all be minor in scope. Individuals and for-profit entities spend 
quite little (directly) 92  on ordinary campaign finance, via express 
 
 91. As a pair of scholars remarked about the challenge of assessing grassroots lobbying, 
understanding quasi campaign finance is also like “a blind man searching for a black cat in a coal 
bin at midnight.” Linda L. Fowler & Ronald G. Shaiko, The Grass Roots Connection: 
Environmental Activists and Senate Roll Calls, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 484, 487 (1987) (quoting Burdett 
A. Loomis, A New Era: Groups and the Grass Root, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 184 (Allan J. 
Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 1983)); see also, e.g., SCHLOZMAN ET AL., UNHEAVENLY 
CHORUS, supra note 29, at 401 (“[T]here is no obvious source of systematic information . . . about 
grassroots lobbying efforts . . . .”). 
 92. Indirectly, individuals and for-profit entities provide the bulk of political entities’ 
resources, which are then spent primarily on ordinary campaign finance. See, e.g., Top Individuals 
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advocacy or electioneering communication.93 It is thus unlikely, though 
not impossible, that they would devote significant resources to quasi 
campaign finance. If they did conduct extensive nonelectoral activities, 
after all, why would they not complement them with electoral 
advocacy? 94  Analogously, political entities such as political action 
committees (“PACs”), super PACs, and § 527 organizations are 
structured as such because they mostly urge the election or defeat of 
particular candidates.95 It would be outside these groups’ missions to 
communicate frequently with voters about nonelectoral issues. 
This leaves nonprofit entities, which notably include almost every 
organization discussed thus far. 96  AFP and the other Koch-funded 
groups are 501(c)(4)s, as are Steyer’s NextGen Climate Action and 
Bloomberg’s Partnership for a New American Economy Action 
 
Funding Outside Spending Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018 &disp=D&type=V&superonly=N 
[https://perma.cc/3XUJ-2V5U] (listing the largest individual donors to outside spending groups 
in 2018); Top Organizations Funding Outside Spending Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. 
(Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=
D&type=O&superonly=N [https://perma.cc/7VG5-A4NM] (same for organizations). 
 93. In 2018, for example, the most an individual spent directly on federal elections was 
$271,864 (by Bill Bloomfield) and the most a corporation spent directly was $53,546 (by Patagonia 
Inc.). See 2018 Outside Spending, by Group, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A 
[https://perma.cc/H747-4DHF]; see also, e.g., Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political 
Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and Executives, 18 BUS. POL. 367, 367 (2016) 
(finding that, after Citizens United, “[t]he anticipated flood of corporate political cash has 
amounted to no more than a trickle”). By comparison, ninety-nine other entities spent more than 
$1 million. 2018 Outside Spending, by Group, supra.  
 94. There could be sensible answers such as maintaining anonymity and obtaining tax 
advantages. However, electoral advocacy can also be conducted anonymously (through donations 
to dark money groups) and donations to 501(c)(4)s are not tax-deductible. 
 95. For a helpful discussion of the different kinds of political entities, see Types of Advocacy 
Groups, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/types.php [https:// 
perma.cc/73AU-JDSN]. 
 96. More specifically, it leaves 501(c)(4)s, 501(c)(5)s, and 501(c)(6)s. “[N]o substantial part 
of the activities” of 501(c)(3) charities may be “carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, 
to influence legislation.” 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). Even among 501(c)(4)s, “advocacy, 
whether lobbying or campaign intervention . . . takes place in less than one-third of . . . 
organizations and generates less than one-seventh of the subsector’s revenue.” Ellen P. Aprill, 
Examining the Landscape of § 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 345, 364 (2018). 
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Fund. 97  The SEIU and the AFL-CIO are both 501(c)(5)s. 98  Drew 
Dimmery and Andrew Peterson recently published the best available 
(though still far from satisfactory) analysis of the political activities of 
nonprofit entities. Dimmery and Peterson first used a machine-
learning algorithm to scour the websites of hundreds of thousands of 
nonprofit groups and categorize them as political or nonpolitical.99 The 
authors then obtained from the Internal Revenue Service the political 
groups’ tax returns, which contain their annual budgets.100 Lastly, the 
authors multiplied the total annual spending of the political groups by 
an estimate of the share of the groups’ budgets that is devoted to 
political activities.101 This method yielded a total of $760 million in 
nonprofit political spending in 2011.102 
This figure must be taken with a large grain of salt, at least as an 
approximation of the volume of quasi campaign finance. First, it covers 
all political activities carried out by political nonprofit groups. But 
these activities include not just quasi campaign finance but also regular 
campaign finance (which non-501(c)(3)s may fund as long as it is not 
their primary function103) and direct lobbying (which non-501(c)(3)s 
may undertake without limit104). Second, the figure does not take into 
 
 97. See Ams. for Prosperity Found., Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income 
Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/
753148958/201803189349307405/full [https://perma.cc/STK6-D8BF]; Nextgen Climate Action, 
Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2016), 
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/461957345/201733199349313158/full [https:// 
perma.cc/2GV6-5MNJ]; P’ship for a New Am. Econ. Action Fund, Form 990, Return of Organization 
Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/ 
display_990/273604435/03_2019_prefixes_27-31%2F273604435_201712_990O_2019030716156901  
[https://perma.cc/H2AY-EYKJ]. 
 98. See AFL-CIO Laws. Coordinating Comm., Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt 
from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/
organizations/521304063/201830959349300148/full [https://perma.cc/GU82-HXZW]; Serv. Emp. 
Int’l Union, Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (OMB No. 1545-0047) 
(2017), https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/930323147/06_2020_prefixes_87-
95%2F930323147_201709_990O_2020061117187336 [https://perma.cc/949B-LWHT]. 
 99. See Dimmery & Peterson, Shining the Light, supra note 10, at 54–61. The algorithm was 
trained using groups known to be political (such as PACs). See id. at 55. 
 100. See id. at 62. 
 101. See id. at 62–64. 
 102. See id. at 65. 
 103. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (2020) (permitting “participation or intervention 
in political campaigns” as long as groups are not “operated primarily” for this purpose). 
 104. Compare id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (imposing no lobbying restrictions on 501(c)(4)s), with id. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(i) (permitting 501(c)(3)s to “devote [no] more than an insubstantial part of 
[their] activities” to lobbying). 
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account quasi campaign finance paid for by entities that are not 
nonprofit groups. These entities may not be the most lavish spenders 
in this area, 105  but their efforts still cannot be ignored. And third, 
Dimmery and Peterson “simply use a figure of 1 percent” as their 
estimate of the share of political nonprofit groups’ budgets that is 
devoted to political activities.106 This is nothing more than an educated 
guess, which is why the authors “invite readers to adjust [the] 
estimate[] according to their prior beliefs.”107 
Despite these problems, $760 million is probably in the ballpark 
of what is spent annually on quasi campaign finance. Several other data 
points also suggest a sum on the order of $1 billion, or maybe somewhat 
more. 108  For instance, Edward Walker has surveyed grassroots 
lobbying firms and concluded that they amount to a roughly $1 billion 
industry.109 As noted earlier, there is considerable overlap between 
grassroots lobbying and quasi campaign finance, one of whose aims is 
often motivating contacts between voters and their representatives.110 
Similarly, 501(c)(4)s that engage in “civil rights, social action, and 
advocacy” have a total annual revenue of around $2 billion.111 These 
groups include many of the most familiar and prolific spenders on quasi 
campaign finance. And according to the Wesleyan Media Project, close 
to $400 million was disbursed on issue advertising that did not overtly 
support or oppose candidates in the 2016 election cycle. 112  Such 
 
 105. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 106. Dimmery & Peterson, Shining the Light, supra note 10, at 64.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Dimmery and Peterson agree that their $760 million figure is “a conservative estimate of 
the actual political expenditure of nonprofits.” Id. 
 109. See Edward T. Walker, Opinion, Grass-Roots Mobilization, by Corporate America, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), https://nyti.ms/O9zvBX [https://perma.cc/QM2Z-PUH5]; see also, e.g., 
EDWARD T. WALKER, GRASSROOTS FOR HIRE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSULTANTS IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 68 (2014) (noting an earlier estimate that grassroots lobbying was an $800 million 
industry in the 1990s). 
 110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 111. See JEREMY KOULISH, FROM CAMPS TO CAMPAIGN FUNDS: THE HISTORY, ANATOMY, 
AND ACTIVITIES OF 501(C)(4) ORGANIZATIONS 16 (2016). Of course, it is unclear what 
proportion of this $2 billion is spent on quasi campaign finance rather than on other political 
activities. 
 112. This data is on file with the author and was obtained from the Wesleyan Media Project. 
Data Access, WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT, http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/dataaccess 
[https://perma.cc/58DP-JV2J]. The Wesleyan Media Project only tracks commercials that refer to 
at least one candidate, so spending on issue ads that do not mention a candidate is unknown. The 
$400 million figure also includes only congressional and gubernatorial elections; it omits 
presidential and down-ballot races. See also, e.g., JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-
91GOV, SOFT AND HARD MONEY IN CONTEMPORARY ELECTIONS: WHAT FEDERAL LAW 
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advertising about nonelectoral politics is a classic tool of quasi 
campaign finance.  
The Wesleyan Media Project’s advertising dataset also hints that 
the volume of quasi campaign finance may be rising. Only $250 million 
was spent on issue advertising that refrained from using magic words 
in the 2012 election cycle—more than 30 percent less than in the 2016 
cycle. 113  Likewise, Professor John Cluverius has shown that “[t]he 
rate[] of citizen contact to politicians has increased as much as tenfold 
in the last decade.”114 This surge may be attributable to both greater 
funding of nonelectoral communications with voters and the 
emergence of more convenient digital means of reaching out to elected 
officials.115 And Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez’s survey of the Koch 
network indicates that its groups’ budgets have exploded. Koch-
backed entities that pay for quasi campaign finance had combined 
budgets of just $6 million in 2001–2002, compared to $433 million in 
2013–2014.116 
If the scale of quasi campaign finance is, in fact, about $1 billion 
per year, then it belongs in the same conversation as conventional 
campaign finance and direct lobbying. Ordinary campaign spending 
has averaged approximately $3 billion per year over the last few 
election cycles.117 Direct (non-grassroots) lobbying expenditures have 
also hovered near $3 billion annually in recent years.118 Yet both of 
these activities are the subjects of entire cottage industries of scholarly 
 
DOES AND DOES NOT REGULATE 5 (Mar. 15, 2002) (citing an estimate of $509 million spent on 
broadcast issue advocacy in 2000); Richard L. Hall & Molly E. Reynolds, Targeted Issue 
Advertising and Legislative Strategy: The Inside Ends of Outside Lobbying, 74 J. POL. 888, 888 
(2012) (noting that spending on issue advertising in the Washington, D.C. media market totaled 
$400 million in the 108th Congress).  
 113. Again, this data is on file with the author. 
 114. John Cluverius, How the Flattened Costs of Grassroots Lobbying Affect Legislator 
Responsiveness, 70 POL. RSCH. Q. 279, 281 (2017). 
 115. See id. at 280–81; see also, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 24 (noting “[g]rowth in the 
use of grass roots tactics by corporations and trade associations”); Anthony J. Nownes & Patricia 
Freeman, Interest Group Activity in the States, 60 J. POL. 86, 93 (1998) (finding that “in the 1990s 
grass-roots techniques [were] more common everywhere than they were in the early 1980s”). 
 116. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at app. A. All calculations are by the 
author. The budgets of the Koch-backed groups, of course, pay for activities beyond quasi 
campaign finance. 
 117. See Cost of Election, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/
overview/cost.php [https://perma.cc/PCX7-L654] (showing total costs of $5.7 billion for the two-
year 2018 federal election cycle and $6.5 billion for the 2016 cycle). 
 118. See Lobbying Data Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (July 23, 2020), https://
www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying [https://perma.cc/6ATJ-J6DW] (showing total direct 
federal lobbying of almost $3.5 billion in 2018 and close to $3.4 billion in 2017). 
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commentary, while, until now, quasi campaign finance has evaded 
sustained academic scrutiny. Quasi campaign finance is much more 
voluminous, too, than the dark money that the Supreme Court’s 2010 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC legalized.119 Nonprofit entities that 
do not disclose their donors make less than $100 million of campaign 
expenditures per year.120 These same groups devote perhaps ten times 
more resources to quasi campaign finance, which nevertheless draws 
only a fraction of the attention. 
E. Drivers 
If quasi campaign finance warrants as close an examination as 
other categories of political spending, then it is important to 
understand its drivers: the factors that cause it to go up or down. One 
such factor is organizational type. Certain sorts of groups may have a 
greater inclination (or ability) to pay for nonelectoral communications 
than other kinds of entities. The relevant literature, however, is of two 
minds about who is more likely to engage in quasi campaign finance. 
More recent studies have noted the vast sums deployed by conservative 
nonprofit groups—within the Koch network, in particular 121 —and 
compared them to the sparser spending of liberal nonprofits. 122 
Political scientist Jason Sclar and his coauthors, for example, tracked 
donations to Koch-backed groups and to groups approved by the 
liberal Democracy Alliance (“DA”) over a ten-year period.123 “The 
aggregate resources orchestrated by the DA fall far short of those 
directed by the Koch seminars,” determined Sclar’s team.124 “[T]he 
Koch seminars are not only raising greater sums than the DA partners, 
 
 119. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). Prior to Citizens United, nonprofit 
entities were generally prohibited from making campaign expenditures. Indeed, Citizens United 
itself, the plaintiff in the landmark case, is a nonprofit corporation. See id.  
 120. See Dark Money Basics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-
money/basics [https://perma.cc/PWL3-UAXY] (showing total dark money spending of nearly 
$160 million in both the 2016 and the 2018 two-year federal election cycles, or around $80 million 
per year).  
 121. See, e.g., Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 684–87. 
 122. See, e.g., Jason Sclar, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol & Vanessa 
Williamson, Donor Consortia on the Left and Right: Comparing the Membership, Activities, and 
Impact of the Democracy Alliance and the Koch Seminars, presented at the Annual Meeting of 




 123. See id. at 40 fig.6. 
 124. Id. at 4. 
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they are channeling those heftier resources to a more compact set of 
organizations directly controlled by the Koch network itself.”125 
In contrast, earlier studies tended to distinguish between left-
leaning public interest groups and labor unions on the one hand, and 
right-leaning corporations, trade associations, and professional 
associations on the other. Relying on surveys of groups’ activities 
rather than audits of their resources, these works found that the former 
organizations were more apt to mount grassroots lobbying 
campaigns,126 to hold protests,127 to broadcast issue advertising,128 and 
to use their websites for political expression.129 These diverging lines of 
scholarship may be reconcilable temporally or methodologically. 
Temporally, it is possible that liberal groups used to be the biggest 
spenders on quasi campaign finance but have been surpassed by 
conservative groups over the last couple decades. Methodologically, it 
may be that liberal groups have been outgunned all along, and that 
earlier studies missed this imbalance by treating all organizations alike, 
regardless of the scale of their spending. More research is necessary to 
sort between these (and other) explanations. 
Another factor that influences the decision to resort to quasi 
campaign finance is the broader political environment. Mass 
communications with the electorate are expensive (due to the number 
 
 125. Id. at 41; see also, e.g., Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol & Jason Sclar, When 
Political Mega-Donors Join Forces: How the Koch Network and the Democracy Alliance Influence 
Organized U.S. Politics on the Right and Left, 32 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 127, 144 (2018) (observing 
that “the hundreds of millions generated by the Koch seminars exceed DA giving by two- to 
threefold”). This analysis, however, does not distinguish between quasi campaign finance and 
other kinds of political spending. 
 126. See, e.g., KOLLMAN, supra note 29, at 41 (“[P]ublic interest groups and labor unions 
comprise the bulk of the organizations using outside lobbying tactics, while professional and trade 
associations  and corporations comprise the bulk of the organizations at the lower end of the 
scale.”); Anthony J. Nownes & Krissy Walker DeAlejandro, Lobbying in the New Millennium: 
Evidence of Continuity and Change in Three States, 9 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 429, 445 (2009) 
(“[L]obbyists for citizen groups . . . tend to rely more on outside lobbying techniques than 
lobbyists for business firms . . . .”).  
 127. See, e.g., Nownes & Freeman, supra note 115, at 100 (“[L]abor, citizen, and 
religious/charitable groups are much more likely than corporate, trade/professional, and 
intergovernmental groups and lobbyists to say they engage in protest activity.”).  
 128. See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 12, at 900 (“[C]ompared to professional associations . . . 
labor unions are more likely to use [independent spending and issue advertising]” and “citizen 
groups . . . are more likely to use issue advertising.”).  
 129. See, e.g., SCHLOZMAN ET AL., UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 29, at 403 
(“[C]orporations are very unlikely to use their Web sites for political information and activation,” 
while “labor unions,” “public interest organizations,” and “organizations on behalf of the poor” 
are “quite likely to do so.”).  
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of voters who must be reached) and risky (since voters’ reactions to the 
messages cannot be perfectly forecast).130 As a result, Professor Frank 
Baumgartner and his coauthors showed, after reviewing almost a 
hundred policy areas, groups seeking to change the status quo are more 
likely to conduct “outside advocacy” and “grassroots advocacy.” 131 
These efforts include “organiz[ing] a public relations campaign,” 
“mobiliz[ing] the general public,” and “mobiliz[ing] [the groups’ own] 
rank-and-file members.” 132  Conversely, actors hoping to preserve 
existing laws tend to employ less costly tactics with a narrower range 
of possible outcomes.133 These actors are the beneficiaries of the status 
quo bias of American politics, and so have less reason to disrupt the 
prevailing policy configuration. 
The mass nature of quasi campaign finance also makes it a poor 
vehicle for addressing obscure or technical issues. Ordinary voters 
cannot easily be galvanized about such matters by canvassing, rallies, 
commercials, and the like. Consequently, groups communicate more 
frequently with the electorate when nonelectoral topics are highly 
salient. Across a set of bills debated by a single Congress, “grassroots 
advocacy” was “more often used by groups active on high-priority 
issues.” 134  Similarly, over a wider range of subjects considered by 
Professor Ken Kollman, both the salience and the popularity of policies 
correlated with an “outside lobbying index” measuring “the number of 
outside lobbying tactics used and the scope of those tactics.”135 
An incumbent’s electoral vulnerability is a further aspect of the 
political environment that drives the use of quasi campaign finance. 
When a politician is secure in her seat, there is little point in 
 
 130. See, e.g., Marie Hojnacki & David C. Kimball, The Who and How of Organizations’ 
Lobbying Strategies in Committee, 61 J. POL. 999, 1003 (1999) (noting the “inherent 
unpredictability of grassroots campaigns”). 
 131. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID C. 
KIMBALL & BETH L. LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND 
WHY 151, 156 (2009). 
 132. Id. at 156; see also, e.g., Hojnacki & Kimball, supra note 130, at 1019 (“[O]rganizations 
advocating a change to the legislative status quo are much more likely than proponents of the 
status quo to lobby . . . through the grassroots.”). Of course, quasi campaign finance includes 
more than grassroots lobbying.  
 133. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 131, at 156; Hojnacki & Kimball, supra note 130, 
at 1020.  
 134. Hojnacki & Kimball, supra note 130, at 1019.  
 135. KOLLMAN, supra note 29, at 89–93; see also, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 131, 
at 158 (finding that “[o]utside advocacy tactics . . . rise from 32 to 57 percent [in frequency] when 
we move from the least to the most salient issues”). Again, grassroots lobbying and quasi 
campaign finance are not synonymous.  
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communicating nonelectorally with voters in that constituency. These 
messages rely on electoral mechanisms to be effective (otherwise they 
would not be quasi campaign finance), 136  but the mechanisms are 
unlikely to succeed when the incumbent is unassailable. On the other 
hand, when a politician’s reelection chances are less certain, the 
electoral links are more apt to make a difference. In that case, the 
incumbent may be more threatened by a group’s future electoral 
mobilization, or more sensitive to shifts in the direction or intensity of 
public opinion. 137  Consistent with this logic, Professor Kenneth 
Goldstein found in a survey of close to a hundred grassroots lobbying 
campaigns that groups mostly “targeted those members whom they 
viewed as being potentially vulnerable.”138 An in-depth analysis of a 
single legislative battle (over the 2003 Medicare prescription drug bill) 
confirmed that groups “target their issue advertising buys in areas . . . 
where incumbent legislators are electorally vulnerable.”139 
The final factor that scholars have tied to the volume of quasi 
campaign finance is the legal (as opposed to the political) environment. 
Professor Robert Hogan polled more than a thousand groups in almost 
forty states about their political activities. 140  He also coded the 
contribution limits in each state, which vary from very low to entirely 
absent.141 Connecting these two datasets, he determined that groups 
treat quasi and regular campaign finance as substitutes, switching from 
one to the other as the legal regime changes. Specifically, groups are 12 
percent more likely to make independent expenditures and 8 percent 
more likely to broadcast issue advertising when contribution limits are 
most stringent rather than most lenient.142 Groups’ political efforts are 
thus like “a water balloon” that “shifts or adjusts in response to contact 
with a barrier.”143 If the balloon is squeezed at one end (due to tighter 
 
 136. See supra Part I.A (defining quasi campaign finance). 
 137. See supra Part I.A (identifying the electoral mechanisms upon which quasi campaign 
finance depends for its effectiveness).  
 138. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 68. 
 139. Hall & Reynolds, supra note 112, at 901. Once more, neither the grassroots lobbying 
studied by Goldstein, nor the issue advertising analyzed by Hall and Reynolds, comprises the 
entirety of quasi campaign finance.  
 140. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 895–97. 
 141. See id. at 890–92 (referring specifically to PAC contribution limits).  
 142. See id. at 900–01. 
 143. Id. at 889. I reiterate that independent expenditures and issue advertising are not the 
whole of quasi campaign finance. Hogan’s study is also admittedly “cross-sectional,” and thus 
“not ideal for establishing causation.” Id. at 890 n.3. For another scholar positing an inverse 
relationship between quasi and regular campaign finance, see Michael S. Kang, The End of 
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conventional campaign finance regulations), it swells on the other side 
(through more quasi campaign finance).  
F. Effects 
Distilling the above studies, we may tentatively conclude that 
more money is spent on quasi campaign finance by conservative 
(rather than liberal) groups, which want to upset the status quo (rather 
than maintain it), on higher- (rather than lower-) profile issues, in more 
competitive (rather than safer) constituencies, and when ordinary 
campaign finance law is stricter (rather than laxer). Now let us turn the 
telescope around, from the causes of quasi campaign finance to the 
effects it has on voters, on politicians, and on enacted policy. 
With respect to the electorate, there is no academic literature on 
point. No scholar, that is, has examined how communications about 
nonelectoral politics influence mass public opinion. An array of 
informed observers, however, believe they do not have much of an 
impact. After interviewing many activists, for instance, Goldstein 
concluded that grassroots campaigns against the Clinton 
administration’s health care proposal did not “chang[e] national public 
opinion.”144 “We were trying to move congressional votes, not Gallup 
numbers,” a lobbyist explained to Goldstein.145 More recently, Koch-
network officials have bemoaned their failure to convince voters of 
their “goal of advancing a free society.”146  “[W]e were not able to 
educate many in the tea party more about . . . how free markets work,” 
remarked one donor. 147  Even the Supreme Court has expressed 
skepticism about the efficacy of issue advertising. In the 2007 case of 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court opined that “[a]n issue ad’s 
impact on an election, if it exists at all, will come only after the voters 
hear the information and choose—uninvited by the ad—to factor it 
into their voting decisions.”148 
 
Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 41 (2012), predicting that, in the wake of Citizens 
United, “campaign money [formerly] spent by outside groups on issue advocacy . . . now will be 
spent largely on express advocacy in the form of independent expenditures.” Id. 
 144. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 77.  
 145. Id. 
 146. Kenneth P. Vogel, Behind the Retreat of the Koch Brothers’ Operation, POLITICO (Oct. 
27, 2016, 5:03 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/koch-brothers-campaign-struggles-
230325 [https://perma.cc/GR8J-VKR2]. 
 147. Id. 
 148. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,  551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007); see also, e.g., Sharon Beder, 
Public Relations’ Role in Manufacturing Artificial Grass Roots Coalitions, 43 PUB. RELS. Q. 20, 
23 (1998) (noting that “it would be virtually impossible” for “letter-writing campaigns . . . actually 
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Assuming these views are correct, why would quasi campaign 
finance have so little sway over the electorate? One answer is that 
shifting public opinion is simply very difficult. Any given lever must 
compete with unforeseen events, media coverage, other actors who 
want to move sentiment in a different direction, and the poorly grasped 
intricacies of how people make up, and change, their minds. Notably, 
a meta-study of regular campaign finance by Professors Joshua Kalla 
and David Broockman found that it, too, does not affect voters’ choices 
in general elections.149 This null result holds for canvassing, phone calls, 
direct mail, and television and online advertising—in short, just about 
every tactic in the modern campaign toolkit.150 
Another explanation is that many spenders on quasi campaign 
finance do not try to communicate with the whole electorate. Instead, 
they tend to limit their outreach to a subset of voters: higher 
socioeconomic-status individuals whose preferences, the funders 
expect, will carry more weight with policymakers.151 As predicted by 
this account, when Goldstein created a regression model for being 
asked to contact a member of Congress, its output showed that “whites, 
males, and the better educated were significantly more likely to receive 
a request.”152 Walker’s survey of grassroots lobbying firms, likewise, 
indicated that their “requests for citizen engagement are targeted 
primarily at pre-existing political activists, strong political participants, 
likely voters, and the college educated.”153 
Turning from voters to politicians, the anecdotal evidence is again 
consistent, only this time it points the other way. Namely, quasi 
campaign finance does affect the positions that elected officials take 
and the policies they adopt. “In virtually all of [Professor Anthony 
 
to get a majority of the people behind a position” (quoting ROBERT SHERRILL, WHY THEY CALL 
IT POLITICS: A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S GOVERNMENT 376 (5th ed. 1990))).  
 149. See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects of 
Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 148, 148 (2018) (analyzing dozens of field experiments). However, campaigns can have 
significant effects in primary elections, voter initiatives, and referenda. Id. at 149.  
 150. Id. at 148.  
 151. Note that this is still quasi campaign finance because it remains segments of voters 
(rather than policymakers) who are contacted. 
 152. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 114.  
 153. WALKER, supra note 109, at 11; see also, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, HENRY E. 
BRADY & SIDNEY VERBA, UNEQUAL AND UNREPRESENTED: POLITICAL INEQUALITY AND THE 
PEOPLE’S VOICE IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 134–36 (2018) (showing that the percentage of 
respondents asked to engage in at least one of five political acts rises in tandem with 
socioeconomic status). 
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Nownes’s] interviews with [grassroots] lobbyists,” he heard that “[t]he 
influence of constituent opinion on the behavior of elected officials—
especially legislators—cannot be overestimated.” 154  Congressional 
employees surveyed by the Congressional Management Foundation 
agreed about “the value of grassroots advocacy campaigns.”155 Huge 
majorities of staffers stated that “in-person visits by constituents,” 
“[i]ndividualized postal letters,” and “individualized e-mails from 
constituents”—all forms of contact often induced by quasi campaign 
finance—are “effective strateg[ies] for influencing Members.”156 
Fortunately, we have more to go on here than anecdotes. 
Professor Daniel Bergan conducted a pair of studies (the latter in 
collaboration with Professor Richard Cole) in which state legislators 
were randomly assigned to groups that either were or were not the 
targets of grassroots lobbying. In the first study, New Hampshire 
legislators who received e-mails from anti-smoking activists were 
twenty percentage points more likely to vote for a smoke-free 
workplace bill.157 In the second experiment, Michigan legislators who 
were called by their constituents were twelve points more inclined to 
support an anti-bullying bill.158 Bergan thus determined that “outside 
lobbying has a large effect on legislative voting,”159 though he and Cole 
cautioned that its impact may be weaker when issues “have been on 
the public agenda longer,” when “policymakers have prior information 
about public opinion,” or when “the policy in question is central to one 
or both of the parties’ legislative agendas.”160 
Even as to these thornier issues, Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez’s 
work suggests that quasi campaign finance moves public policy in the 
 
 154. NOWNES, supra note 36, at 79; see also, e.g., WALKER, supra note 109, at 99 (noting the 
important role of “in-person visits with public officials, as well as hard-copy letters, phone calls, 
emails, and faxes” in “[c]ampaigns focused on shaping legislation”).  
 155. CONG. MGMT. FOUND., COMMUNICATING WITH CONGRESS: PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZEN 
ADVOCACY ON CAPITOL HILL 5 (2011). 
 156. Fielding, supra note 29, at 770–71; see also, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard, Lobbying Is an 
Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 23, 49 (2008) (reporting similar results from another survey of congressional staff).  
 157. See Bergan, supra note 15, at 342–43.  
 158. See Daniel E. Bergan & Richard T. Cole, Call Your Legislator: A Field Experimental 
Study of the Impact of a Constituency Mobilization Campaign on Legislative Voting, 37 POL. 
BEHAV. 27, 28 (2015). 
 159. Bergan, supra note 15, at 343. 
 160. Bergan & Cole, supra note 158, at 37; see also, e.g., Cluverius, supra note 114, at 286–87 
(refining Bergan and Cole’s results by showing that a “higher volume” of emails makes 
“legislators less willing to take meaningful action on legislation”). I also add my usual caveat that 
grassroots lobbying and quasi campaign finance are not identical. 
STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:50 PM 
2020] QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE 367 
funders’ preferred direction. In one study, the authors tallied whether 
AFP had a paid director in each state as well as whether each state 
restricted public-sector union bargaining rights in the wake of the 2010 
Republican wave election. 161  The presence of a paid AFP state 
director, which is indicative of more intense AFP activity, made it 
almost thirty points more likely that union bargaining rights would be 
curbed.162 In another analysis, Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol, and Daniel 
Lynch used a more sophisticated scale to measure the strength of both 
AFP and some of its sister organizations in each state.163 Shifting from 
the least to the most powerful Koch network reduced the probability 
of a state expanding Medicaid by fully seventy percentage points.164 
Even more strikingly, the public consistently opposed AFP’s 
efforts. In no state did a majority back the limitation of public-sector 
union bargaining rights; the average level of support was close to 40 
percent.165 An even larger share of respondents (almost two-thirds) 
favored Medicaid expansion. 166  Thus whenever AFP succeeded, it 
“pull[ed] government policy away from the preferences held by most 
Americans and toward those of a smaller group of businesses, activists, 
and donors.”167 AFP’s quasi campaign finance, in other words, widened 
the gap between what people want and what they actually get from 
their representatives. 
This presents a bit of a puzzle: How can nonelectoral 
communications with voters fail to affect them—the messages’ 
recipients—while still influencing politicians? One possibility is that, 
thanks to the communications, elected officials wrongly think their 
 
 161. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 694. 
 162. See id.; see also ALEXANDER HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, STATE CAPTURE: HOW 
CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISTS, BIG BUSINESSES, AND WEALTHY DONORS RESHAPED THE 
AMERICAN STATES—AND THE NATION 182 (2019) (finding that greater Koch network strength 
is associated with a higher likelihood of public employee bargaining cutbacks). 
 163. See Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol & Lynch, supra note 4, at 243, 247–48 (using statistical 
models and case studies to analyze the impact of the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(“ALEC”) and the State Policy Network (“SPN”), in addition to AFP, on the Medicaid expansion 
debate in four states).  
 164. See id. at 254; see also HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 202 (finding “a very 
strong relationship between levels of [Koch network] strength and coordination and Medicaid 
expansion”). The main caveats to these studies are that they are cross-sectional and that Koch 
network strength is a function of more than just quasi campaign finance. 
 165. See Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 694. 
 166. See HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 254 (reporting only a national figure). 
 167. Id.; see also Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 692 (“Koch network 
operations have contributed to growing gaps across issue-areas between GOP policy stands and 
majority citizen preferences . . . .”). 
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constituents’ views have been swayed, and then adjust their own 
stances to align with public opinion as they incorrectly perceive it. This 
is not an implausible scenario. In a pioneering study, Broockman and 
political scientist Christopher Skovron found that most state legislators 
err when asked to estimate their voters’ policy preferences, usually 
overestimating these attitudes’ conservatism. 168  This right-wing bias 
may arise because Republican constituents are more likely to contact 
their representatives than are Democrats.169 The asymmetric pattern of 
grassroots contacts, in turn, could well be the product of the higher 
conservative spending on quasi campaign finance.170 
Another solution to the riddle might be the targeting, noted 
above, 171  of higher socioeconomic-status individuals. Nonelectoral 
communications may change their minds—or, at least, make issues 
more salient for them and easier to link to politicians—while not 
impacting the broader electorate. Politicians could then be responsive 
to the shifting concerns of these especially influential voters. This story 
has anecdotal support; as one grassroots lobbyist said to Goldstein, 
members of Congress “spend ninety percent of their time with one 
percent of the population,” and “[w]e want[] that one percent to be 
people who [are] going to communicate our message.” 172  More 
rigorous studies corroborate the story, too. As I have explained in 
earlier work, most campaign donors are higher socioeconomic-status 
individuals, 173  and elected officials’ voting records almost perfectly 
 
 168. See David E. Broockman & Christopher Skovron, Bias in Perceptions of Public Opinion 
Among Political Elites, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 542, 547–57 (2018); see also HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, 
supra note 162, at 255 (finding that “the average legislator overestimated constituent 
conservatism”). 
 169. See Broockman & Skovron, supra note 168, at 557–59.  
 170. See supra notes 121–25125 and accompanying text; cf. HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 
162, at 256 (finding that politicians who report relying more heavily on ALEC (the Koch-funded 
support group for legislators) are even more mistaken in their views of their constituents’ 
preferences). 
 171. See supra notes 151–53153 and accompanying text. 
 172. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 87.  
 173. See Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1474 (noting the 
consensus that donors are “overwhelmingly wealthy, highly educated, male, and white” (quoting 
PETER L. FRANCIA, JOHN C. GREEN, PAUL S. HERRNSON, LYNDA W. POWELL & CLYDE 
WILCOX, THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: INVESTORS, IDEOLOGUES, AND 
INTIMATES 16 (2003))).  
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mirror their donors’ desires while bearing little relation to their 
constituents’ views.174 
A final answer is the first electoral mechanism I outlined earlier: 
the threat of future electoral mobilization. 175  Say that politicians 
accurately perceive their voters’ policy preferences. Also assume that 
nonelectoral communications do not target any particular group. Quasi 
campaign finance could still affect politicians by signaling to them that 
the funders could undertake an equivalent effort—only this time, an 
electoral one—during the next campaign. For this signal to work, 
politicians simply have to want to be elected 176  and to think that 
electoral spending makes some difference for their electoral odds.177 
As long as these conditions are satisfied, politicians have an incentive 
to do what the funders of nonelectoral communications want, even if 
these messages are ineffective. The reason is that the messages’ 
electoral successors, disseminated during the next campaign, may not 
be so impotent.  
II.  THE LEGAL STATUS OF QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
To this point, I have only tried to grasp the concept of quasi 
campaign finance: to define it and distinguish it from other kinds of 
political activity, to present some examples of it, and to explain what is 
known about its scale, causes, and consequences. I have not yet 
grappled with the question that is likely the most salient to legal 
audiences: May quasi campaign finance constitutionally be regulated 
in the same ways as conventional campaign finance? Or, conversely, is 
it unregulable under the First Amendment? Thinking through this 
question is my object in this Part. 
I begin by noting the range of laws that apply to ordinary 
campaign finance—disclosure requirements, contribution limits, and, 
formerly, expenditure caps—but not to garden-variety political speech. 
The validity of these laws, I argue, is best understood as following from 
 
 174. See id. at 1476 (summarizing work showing that “the [ideological] distributions of donors 
and members of Congress are more or less identical” and “in marked contrast to the normal 
distribution of the general public”). 
 175. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. This threat is also far from an empty one. Many 
groups that fund nonelectoral—yet still political—communications pay lavishly for traditional 
campaign finance, too. See supra Part I.C.  
 176. The canonical work presenting politicians as single-minded seekers of reelection is 
DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004). 
 177. As noted above, it is quite unclear if electoral spending actually makes a difference in 
general elections. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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the assignment of regular campaign finance to a specialized electoral 
domain rather than the general sphere of public discourse. Next, I 
consider a number of reasons for equating quasi and conventional 
campaign finance: that they (1) share the same functional features and 
(2) are partial substitutes, which are both capable of (3) corrupting 
officeholders, (4) distorting public opinion, and (5) misaligning 
governmental outputs from popular preferences. Some of these 
reasons are better than others; together, they render plausible (if not 
necessary) the placement of quasi campaign finance in the electoral 
domain. Lastly, I address a couple of other classificatory options. Quasi 
campaign finance could be located in a different specialized domain: a 
policymaking instead of an electoral realm. Quasi campaign finance 
could also be conceived as public discourse—but without becoming 
unregulable as a result. 
Before starting this analysis, I must flag my uncertainty about the 
right conclusion. After weighing all the points and ripostes, I remain 
unsure what legal status should be assigned to quasi campaign finance. 
My goal here is thus to explore rather than to persuade: to probe the 
arguments for and against pairing quasi and ordinary campaign 
finance, but not definitively to accept or reject them. A further caveat 
is that I bracket, for present purposes, the debate over how regular 
campaign finance may permissibly be regulated. This is obviously a 
vital issue on which oceans of ink have been spilled.178 But I ignore it 
here since my interest is the analogy between quasi and conventional 
campaign finance, not the legal treatment of the latter. 
A. Elections Versus Politics 
It is undeniable that ordinary campaign finance is subject to much 
more regulation—valid regulation upheld by the Supreme Court—
than generic political speech. In Buckley and Citizens United, the Court 
sustained requirements that campaign contributions, 179  express 
 
 178. Some of this ink has been my own. I am generally sympathetic to the regulation of regular 
campaign finance, at least if the result is closer alignment between voters’ preferences and the 
government’s outputs. See Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1486–
99; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 336–
42 (2014) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment] (“Under the alignment 
approach, then, the central issue for courts assessing campaign finance laws would be the 
measures’ capacity to curb the noncongruence that stems from electoral spending and 
fundraising.”). 
 179. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68–74 (1976) (per curiam). 
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advocacy,180 and electioneering communication181 all be disclosed to 
the FEC. The Buckley Court also announced the principle, which still 
endures more than forty years later, that contribution limits are 
reviewed relatively deferentially and are usually ratified.182 Even bans 
on independent expenditures by corporations and unions were good 
law for virtually the entire twentieth century183—and would still be 
allowed today if the four dissenters in Citizens United had prevailed.184 
In contrast, standard-issue political speech has never been 
restricted like this.185 Neither its content nor its funding typically has to 
be reported to any authority. When its disclosure has been mandated, 
the Court has been quick to step in and strike down the offending 
requirement. 186  Contribution limits and expenditure bans are even 
rarer policies in the generic political context. Indeed, it is hard to come 
up with good historical examples of such measures187—let alone laws 
the Court did or would uphold. Just imagine a ceiling on how much one 
 
 180. See id. at 80 (upholding FECA’s disclosure requirements for independent expenditures 
after construing them “to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate”). 
 181. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 368–69 (2010) (upholding BCRA’s disclosure 
requirements for electioneering communication and refusing to limit them to “express advocacy 
and its functional equivalent” (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–476 
(2007))).  
 182. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–23. Since Buckley, contribution limits have been invalidated 
by the Court on only two occasions. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014) (plurality 
opinion) (striking down the federal limits on aggregate contributions in an election cycle); 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (plurality opinion) (striking down Vermont’s 
unusually low contribution limits).  
 183. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(“State legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate corporate electioneering . . . for 
more than a century. The Federal Congress has relied on this authority for a comparable stretch 
of time . . . .” (citing Brief for the State of Montana et al. as Amici Curiae Addressing June 29, 
2009 Order for Supplemental Briefing and Supporting Neither Party at 5–13, Citizens United, 558 
U.S. 310 (No. 08-205); Supplemental Brief of John McCain et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellee at 1a–8a, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205))). 
 184. See id. at 478–79.  
 185. By “standard-issue” political speech I mean to exclude regular and quasi campaign 
finance as well as direct and grassroots lobbying. See supra Part I.B (discussing these categories). 
 186. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (striking down 
Ohio’s ban on anonymous political pamphleteering); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 
487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988) (invalidating North Carolina’s requirement that charitable fundraisers 
disclose certain information to potential donors); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) 
(protecting the NAACP’s membership lists from disclosure to the state of Alabama). 
 187. Coming closest, perhaps, is the Colorado ban on paying circulators of initiative petitions 
that the Court invalidated in Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1988). See also Citizens 
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1981) (striking down California’s 
limit on contributions to committees supporting or opposing ballot measures). 
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could give to a political group, or a prohibition on one’s own political 
spending. There probably has not been a Justice in modern times who 
would sustain this sort of regulation. 
Why does First Amendment doctrine tolerate restrictions of 
regular campaign finance that would be unthinkable for garden-variety 
political speech? It could simply be the vagaries of the common law 
method.188 Perhaps a series of precedents have accumulated, without 
any grand plan, that are particularly sympathetic to constraints on 
electoral funding. Path dependency would then account for the 
disparate treatment. Another explanation might be the force of the 
governmental interests that are advanced by the regulation of 
conventional campaign finance. These include preventing politicians 
from being corrupted by large sums of electoral funding 189  and 
informing voters about the activities of campaign donors and 
spenders.190 Maybe these aims are especially compelling and thus able 
to justify speech burdens that would otherwise be unacceptable. 
Maybe.191 In my view, though, there is a more persuasive (and 
more interesting) reason to distinguish between ordinary campaign 
finance and generic political speech. It is that the former may 
reasonably be assigned to a specialized electoral domain, while the 
latter belongs squarely in the sphere of general public discourse. On 
this account, which one might call a partitionist theory of the First 
Amendment,192 there exist multiple zones of human activity, within 
which the legal status of speech varies. One of these zones, and 
doctrinally the most familiar, is public discourse. 193  Here, people 
 
 188. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 877 (1996) (advocating the virtues of common law constitutional interpretation). 
 189. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–29 (1976) (per curiam). 
 190. See, e.g., id. at 66–67. 
 191. I am skeptical of both these explanations. The path-dependency hypothesis is 
undermined by the fact that the Court’s regular campaign finance decisions very frequently cite 
other First Amendment cases. See John O. McGinnis, Neutral Principles and Some Campaign 
Finance Problems, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 841, 887–90 (2016). I also do not see why preventing 
corruption and informing voters are uniquely compelling goals. They seem no more urgent to me 
than many other ends the government pursues.  
 192. I believe this term is new, but I do not otherwise claim to have developed this theory 
myself. For other scholars advancing similar positions, see generally POST, supra note 17; Baker, 
supra note 19; Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 19; Neuborne, supra note 19; and Schauer & 
Pildes, supra note 19. For a related perspective with respect to all of society, not just the free 
speech context, see generally Niklas Luhmann, Differentiation of Society, 2 CAN. J. SOC. 29 (1977). 
 193. See, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First 
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and 
opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
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communicate continuously, ceaselessly, and recursively about matters 
of public relevance. Through these exchanges, public opinion is formed 
and then reformed in a never-ending cycle. Through this interaction, 
too, people come to feel that their government is responsive to their 
views. This sense arises because elected officials, just like the people 
they represent, are participants in, and observers of, the ongoing public 
debate.194 
Under this conception, regulation of public discourse is highly 
suspect. When the government burdens speech on public issues, it 
interferes with the free flow of ideas. Public opinion then emerges not 
(wholly) through the voluntary updating of people’s attitudes but 
rather (at least in part) thanks to the government’s heavy hand. Even 
worse, people may start to believe that their representatives are not 
actually responsive to their needs and interests. How can people 
maintain their faith, after all, in a state that is hindering their 
expression of the very preferences that their elected officials are 
supposed to be heeding?195 
The crux of the partitionist theory, however, is that not all human 
activity is public discourse. Some of it, rather, takes place within 
specialized institutional domains that the government itself has 
established. Classic examples of these institutions include state-run 
schools, workplaces, and prisons, where the government is, 
respectively, educator, employer, and jailer. Inside these institutions, 
crucially, speech may be lawfully limited in order to promote the 
domains’ particular goals. Such restrictions make the institutions work 
better, and thus serve the governmental interests that led to their 
creation in the first place. Such restrictions also do not cause the same 
harms as curbs on public discourse. They do not disrupt the formation 
 
270 (1964) (noting “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
(praising the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people”). 
 194. In the academy, Post has discussed the nature of public discourse at greatest length and 
with the most theoretical sophistication. See generally POST, supra note 17; Robert Post, 
Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1109 (1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake]; Robert Post, Regulating Election 
Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1837 (1999) [hereinafter Post, Regulating 
Election Speech].  
 195. As Post has put it, “government restrictions on public discourse potentially impair 
democratic legitimation.” POST, supra note 17, at 74. Consequently, “courts may properly prevent 
the state from restricting public discourse unless in the service of the most compelling interests.” 
Id. 
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of public opinion because people’s attitudes on public matters are not 
as shaped by their involvement in specialized domains. Nor do the 
restrictions result in an erosion of people’s trust in their government’s 
responsiveness since this conviction, too, is forged elsewhere.196 
Elections, then, are one more institution that may be demarcated 
from public discourse. Elections are held only because the government 
decides to authorize and administer them. There can be no legally 
binding vote in the absence of state action.197 Elections also have a 
series of aims separate from those of public discourse. These include 
enabling citizens to deliberate over, and choose between, candidates 
for office; encouraging citizens to participate in the electoral process; 
accurately tallying voters’ preferences when the moment for decision 
arrives; peacefully transferring (or retaining) power in accordance with 
voters’ wishes; and motivating elected officials adequately and non-
corruptly to represent their constituents. 198  Under the partitionist 
theory, it is therefore reasonable to recognize elections as a distinct 
institutional domain, run by the government for instrumental ends.199 
If elections are carved out of public discourse, then the doctrine’s 
seemingly permissive stance toward restrictions of regular campaign 
finance ceases to be a mystery. Why are disclosure requirements, 
 
 196. I should clarify that these are normative rather than empirical claims. People’s attitudes 
on public matters, and their trust in their government’s responsiveness, could be affected by their 
involvement in specialized domains. But the partitionist theory assumes they are not so affected 
(at least not much). Post, again, addresses so-called “managerial domains” in the most detail. See 
POST, supra note 17, at 81–84, 91–92; Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 194, at 1128–33; Post, 
Regulating Election Speech, supra note 194, at 1840. Other scholars have advanced analogous 
claims of specialized institutional domains. See Baker, supra note 19, at 17–19 (discussing 
“institutionally bound” speech); Briffault, Issue Advocacy, supra note 19, at 1763 (discussing the 
“distinctive jurisprudential regime for election speech”); Neuborne, supra note 19, at 800 
(discussing “‘institutionally bounded’ setting[s]”); Schauer & Pildes, supra note 19, at 1805 
(discussing “bounded domains of communicative activity”). 
 197. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court 2003 Term—Forward: The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 51–52 (2004) (“[E]lections 
and related democratic processes are pervasively regulated.”).  
 198. For a thoughtful article comparing the deliberative and tabulative goals of elections, see 
generally James A. Gardner, Deliberation or Tabulation? The Self-Undermining Constitutional 
Architecture of Election Campaigns, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1413 (2007). I have also discussed the values 
served by elections (and election law) in more detail elsewhere. See Stephanopoulos, Elections 
and Alignment, supra note 178, at 356–60. 
 199. For other scholars portraying elections as specialized institutional domains, see supra 
note 196. For the Court doing so as well, see Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 
Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999), distinguishing between “core political speech” and electoral 
speech and remarking that “there must be a substantial regulation of elections . . . if some sort of 
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes” (first quoting Meyer v. Grant, 
486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988); then quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).  
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contribution limits, and (formerly) certain expenditure bans valid 
when they apply to electoral funding but invalid when they extend to 
generic political speech? Precisely because when they apply to 
electoral funding, they operate within the electoral domain, where 
more regulation is allowed. When they extend to generic political 
speech, conversely, they amount to burdens on public discourse that 
are, for that reason, subject to stringent scrutiny.  
I should acknowledge that the partitionist theory is not without its 
critics. Scholars including Lillian BeVier, 200  John McGinnis, 201 
Geoffrey Stone,202 and Kathleen Sullivan203 have argued that elections 
should be conceived as part of—not apart from—public discourse 
because electoral and political speech cannot be disentangled. In 
McGinnis’s words, the partitionist theory “wrongly suggests that 
expression at election time can be segregated from the political debate 
that is ever-billowing in a democracy.” 204  On the Court, similarly, 
several Justices have opposed erecting a boundary between elections 
on the one side and politics on the other. This “line between electoral 
advocacy and issue advocacy dissolves in practice,” according to Justice 
Antonin Scalia,205 because “discussions of candidates and issues are 
quite often intertwined,” as Justice Anthony Kennedy has put it.206 
Since the partitionist theory has been ably defended elsewhere,207 
I only want to make one observation here about these attacks: they are 
normative, not descriptive, and so do not undermine the theory’s 
ability to explain current First Amendment law. The attacks’ common 
 
 200. See Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political, and 
Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1773 (1999) (arguing that Buckley “eschewed the 
notion [of] a dichotomy between free politics generally and elections in particular as bounded 
institutions”). 
 201. See McGinnis, supra note 191, at 908. 
 202. See Geoffrey R. Stone, “Electoral Exceptionalism” and the First Amendment: A Road 
Paved with Good Intentions, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 665, 673 (2011) (portraying 
“electoral speech” as “largely indistinguishable from general public discourse”). 
 203. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 663, 674–75 (1997) (“[E]lections are seamlessly connected to the informal political debates 
that continue in the periods between them.”). 
 204. McGinnis, supra note 191, at 908. 
 205. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 494 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 206. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 327 (2003) (Kennedy, J. concurring), overruled by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Buckley also stated at one point that “[a]dvocacy of 
the election or defeat of candidates . . . is no less entitled to protection under the First 
Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat 
of legislation.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam). 
 207. See supra note 196.  
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theme is that an electoral domain should not be demarcated from 
public discourse because electoral speech should be seen as equivalent 
to political speech. This may or may not be correct; I think it is not. But 
even if it is right, it only means that contemporary doctrine should be 
amended to eliminate the greater deference that restrictions on 
conventional campaign finance receive at present. It does not change 
the fact that these restrictions do currently receive greater deference 
than analogous limits on garden-variety political speech. It does not 
change the fact, that is, that contemporary doctrine adheres to the 
partitionist theory.208 
B. Assignment to the Electoral Domain 
This adherence forms the backdrop for my core inquiry in this 
Part: analyzing whether quasi campaign finance should be assigned to 
the electoral domain (along with ordinary campaign finance) or to 
public discourse (joining generic political speech). As the preceding 
discussion makes clear, the stakes of this choice are high. If quasi 
campaign finance is placed in the electoral domain, then it may 
permissibly be regulated to further that domain’s ends. But if quasi 
campaign finance is part of public discourse, then it is largely 
unregulable. As I also noted above, I do not come down firmly on one 
side or the other of this difficult debate. 209  I develop the dueling 
arguments without trying to adjudicate between them. 
1. Characteristics.  One reason to equate quasi and regular 
campaign finance is that they share several key characteristics. Both 
activities are paid for primarily by the same actors, namely, wealthy, 
ideologically extreme, and politically active individuals. They make 
most contributions to candidates210 and provide the bulk of the funding 
for entities, such as super PACs, that engage in independent electoral 
 
 208. I readily concede that, post-Citizens United, contemporary doctrine does not reflect the 
partitionist theory to the extent that it did before the decision. The Court used to distinguish 
between electoral expenditures by corporations and unions (which were banned) and 
nonelectoral spending by these entities (which was permitted). The Court no longer makes this 
distinction. Buckley, too, did not adhere to the partitionist theory when it treated electoral 
expenditures by individuals identically to their nonelectoral spending, prohibiting restrictions on 
the former. 
 209. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  
 210. See Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1474–76 
(summarizing the literature on campaign donors).  
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spending.211 They are also the main donors to the 501(c)(4) groups that 
are the most active practitioners of quasi campaign finance.212 Not only 
do quasi and conventional campaign finance have analogous funding 
sources, they pay for analogous tactics, too. Electoral money funds 
television and online advertisements, fundraising solicitations, door-to-
door canvassing, phone banking, speeches, rallies, and protests. The 
same goes for nonelectoral, yet still political, money.213 In both cases, 
spenders purchase mass communications with voters. 
Furthermore, quasi and ordinary campaign finance rely on similar 
mechanisms to be effective. When electoral money has an impact, it is 
through its influence on either voters or politicians. It may convince 
voters to support (or oppose) a candidate, or to go to (or stay home 
from) the polls. It may also prod politicians to do what the funders 
want, whether out of gratefulness for the funders’ resources or fear of 
how these resources could be weaponized in the future. Likewise with 
nonelectoral, yet still political, money. As I explained earlier, it 
depends on electoral links involving either voters or politicians to 
achieve its aims.214 It may change voters’ minds about an issue or make 
that issue more salient and easier to connect to candidates. Voters’ 
behavior at the polls may then shift as a result. Quasi campaign finance 
may also sway politicians thanks to its convertibility down the road into 
regular campaign finance, to which politicians are famously attuned. 
To make this discussion more concrete, consider two recent ads 
aired by AFP. One of them, paid for by conventional campaign finance, 
criticized then-Senator Joe Donnelly of Indiana for saying “he’d 
support tax cuts for hard-working Hoosiers” but then “voting against 
tax cuts for you.”215 It added that viewers should “tell Senator Donnelly 
to put Hoosier jobs first.”216 The other commercial, underwritten by 
 
 211. Compare Top Individuals Funding Outside Spending Groups, supra note 92 (showing the 
biggest individual donors to outside spending groups in the 2018 election cycle), with Top 
Organizations Funding Outside Spending Groups, supra note 92 (showing the biggest 
organizational donors). 
 212. See supra notes 121–25125 and accompanying text (noting that the Koch network and 
the Democracy Alliance are both comprised of individual donors). 
 213. See supra Part I.C (providing examples of these tactics in the quasi campaign finance 
context). 
 214. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 215. Ams. for Prosperity, Senator Donnelly Voted Against Tax Cuts for Hoosiers, YOUTUBE 
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gnB6HYFhos [https://perma.cc/FTL3-ZPJA].  
 216. Id. Note that this ad, while obviously electoral, is neither express advocacy (since it 
avoids the use of magic words) nor electioneering communication (since it was aired too long 
before the next election). 
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quasi campaign finance, warned that “some members of Congress want 
a new trillion-dollar [border adjustment] consumer tax that could drive 
up your costs and hurt our economy.”217 It continued: “Tell Congress 
that’s not the change we’re asking for.”218 
These ads were both funded by AFP. They were both also, well, 
ads—broadcast messages directed at large numbers of voters. Their 
subject matter and policy perspective were identical too: Tax cuts are 
good; tax hikes are bad. And if they had any effect, it was via voters or 
politicians. The first ad may have persuaded voters to oppose Senator 
Donnelly (who ended up losing his 2018 reelection bid) while 
incentivizing Senator Donnelly to modify his stance on taxes. The 
second ad may have caused voters and members of Congress alike to 
disfavor the border adjustment tax proposal that was floated in 2017.219 
Voters’ views might have shifted on the merits of the proposal, while 
members of Congress could have changed their stances out of concern 
about voters’ or AFP’s future actions. This is obviously a substantial 
list of similarities. It cuts in favor of treating quasi and ordinary 
campaign finance symmetrically under the First Amendment due to 
their overlapping features. 
Nor is this form of functional reasoning alien to the Supreme 
Court. In the 2003 case of McConnell v. FEC, the Court evaluated 
BCRA’s extension of the existing regulations of express advocacy—
namely, disclosure requirements and a ban on corporate and union 
spending—to electioneering communication.220  The Court held that 
the extension was constitutional because electioneering 
communication substantively resembled express advocacy. “[T]he two 
categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in important 
respects.”221 “Both were used to advocate the election or defeat of 
clearly identified federal candidates, even though the so-called issue 
ads,” most of which were electioneering communication, “eschewed 
the use of magic words.” 222  The Court thus denied that “the First 
 
 217. Ams. for Prosperity Comm., Tell Congress That’s Not the Change We’re Asking for, 
ISPOT.TV (Apr. 17, 2017), https://ispot.tv/a/wL1_ [https://perma.cc/38SJ-YMEW]. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Timothy M. Todd, What Is a Border Adjustment Tax?, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timtodd/2017/01/17/what-is-a-border-adjustment-tax/#2febddc2bc1b  
[https://perma.cc/4AKP-SVJH].  
 220. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 189–202 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 221. Id. at 126. 
 222. Id. 
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Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-
called issue advocacy.”223 
A future, differently constituted Court could make an equivalent 
move with respect to quasi and regular campaign finance. Since they 
share the same funders, pay for the same kinds of communications, and 
rely on electoral mechanisms involving the same voters and politicians, 
they could be ascribed the same legal status. True, quasi and 
conventional campaign finance are not alike in every way, since the 
latter is and the former is not overtly electoral. But electioneering 
communication and express advocacy are not identical either, since the 
latter does and the former does not necessarily use magic words. This 
contrast did not prove dispositive in McConnell, and neither must the 
electoral distinction between quasi and ordinary campaign finance. 
On the other hand, the relevant portion of McConnell is no longer 
good law. In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court “reject[ed] the 
contention,” which it had accepted in McConnell, that “issue advocacy 
may be regulated because express election advocacy may be.”224 Also 
disagreeing with McConnell, the Court held that some ads that are 
electioneering communication “are not the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.”225 Therefore the state interests that authorize limits 
on express advocacy “cannot justify regulating” these messages.226 
More importantly here, the electoral distinction between quasi 
and regular campaign finance is hardly trivial. The issue at hand is 
whether quasi campaign finance should be located in the electoral 
domain. It is plainly a strike against this placement that quasi campaign 
finance is, by definition, nonelectoral. Yes, quasi campaign finance 
 
 223. Id. at 193. Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas has made a similar functional argument 
for treating contribution and expenditure limits symmetrically—and presumptively striking them 
both down. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 636 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“When an individual donates money . . . he 
enhances the donee’s ability to communicate a message and thereby adds to political debate, just 
as when that individual communicates the message himself.”). In the academy, Heather Gerken 
and Alex Tausanovitch have urged the pairing of campaign finance and lobbying because they 
are “both important means of converting money into political influence.” Heather K. Gerken & 
Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying: Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the 
Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 75 (2014); see also Richard Briffault, Lobbying 
and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 112 (2008) 
[hereinafter Briffault, Lobbying] (“Both lobbying and campaign finance are means to the end of 
influence over government action.”).  
 224. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 477 (2007) (citing McConnell, 550 U.S. at 
205).  
 225. Id. at 478. 
 226. Id. at 479. 
STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:50 PM 
380  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:333 
shares other characteristics of conventional campaign finance: its 
funding sources, its messaging tactics, its underlying mechanisms, and 
so on. But it does not exhibit the feature that arguably defines ordinary 
campaign finance: the fact that it pays for communications that are 
actually about elections. 
It is also significant that the mechanisms underpinning quasi 
campaign finance are less directly electoral than those on which regular 
campaign finance depends. When electoral money influences voters or 
politicians, it does so without any intervening steps. Voters’ electoral 
preferences change, and politicians’ behavior shifts, too, because of the 
immediate electoral consequences they perceive. In contrast, when 
nonelectoral money has an electoral impact, it does so at one remove. 
It sways voters’ nonelectoral attitudes, which may, in turn, affect their 
electoral views. Or it puts politicians on notice that while this policy-
focused campaign may not help or hurt them, a future electoral 
mobilization could be relevant to their careers. These are real electoral 
mechanisms—but they are also more complex, more attenuated links 
than those of conventional campaign finance.  
Lastly, it is unclear what the stopping point is for the argument 
that quasi campaign finance is similar enough functionally to ordinary 
campaign finance that it should be treated like it legally. Take mass 
communications that do not rely on electoral connections to be 
effective, like requests that people give money to protect the 
environment or to fight disease.227 These messages are often funded by 
politically active nonprofit groups, and they use many of the same 
methods as regular campaign finance (here, fundraising solicitations). 
Why should these parallels not be enough to assign these 
communications, too, to the electoral domain? Or consider reports 
from think tanks about political issues. While these publications rarely 
target the mass electorate, their funding commonly comes from the 
same sources as conventional campaign finance, and they certainly 
hope to make an electoral difference.228 So are they part of the electoral 
domain as well?  
These questions are rhetorical. These activities cannot be situated 
in the electoral domain, because if they were, then not much speech 
would remain within public discourse. But that is precisely the point. If 
 
 227. Here, the requested funding is the operative mechanism. If money is donated, it will be 
used directly to advance the group’s aims.  
 228. For example, the State Policy Network is a constellation of conservative think tanks 
funded in part by the Koch brothers. See HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 146–60. 
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the electoral domain can be stretched to include quasi campaign 
finance, it is hard to explain why its boundaries cannot be enlarged a 
little more, to cover activities a bit further afield. Once the expansion 
project begins, in other words, there is no obvious point at which it 
ends.229 
2. Substitutability.  A related reason for conferring the same legal 
status to quasi and ordinary campaign finance is that they are partial 
substitutes for each other. In particular, if more restrictions are 
imposed on electoral money, its suppliers may respond by shifting their 
efforts to nonelectoral, yet still political, spending.230 This reallocation 
is feasible because, as discussed above, quasi and regular campaign 
finance share several key characteristics.231 These overlapping features 
mean that funders may still accomplish their objectives even if they are 
obliged to pay for quasi instead of conventional campaign finance. The 
overlap also suggests that quasi and ordinary campaign finance should 
be treated—and regulated—equally by the law. Otherwise, savvy 
funders could circumvent limits on electoral money simply by switching 
to its nonelectoral cousin.232 
Charles Koch is one prominent advocate of the substitutability 
thesis. To repeat an earlier quote, he sees “education,” “grassroots 
organizations,” “lobbying,” and “political action” as components of “a 
strategy that is vertically and horizontally integrated,” among which 
resources may be freely shuffled. 233  The Koch network’s activities 
reflect this view. They include not just the quasi campaign finance I 
have emphasized here,234 but also a good deal of regular campaign 
finance,235 both of whose volumes ebb and flow from year to year. 
 
 229. See, e.g., Post, Regulating Election Speech, supra note 194, at 1842 (“If all that were 
necessary to bring speech within the authority of a managerial domain were that the speech 
produce effects on the domain, nothing much would be left of public discourse.”).  
 230. See supra notes 140–43143 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 210–19 and accompanying text. 
 232. For other scholars making substitutability arguments, except in the context of campaign 
finance and lobbying, see Briffault, Lobbying, supra note 223, at 111–12 (“Both lobbying and 
campaign finance are means to the end of influencing our government action.”); Gerken & 
Tausanovitch, supra note 223, at 75 (commenting that they “function as substitutes and 
complements within a democratic system”).  
 233. MAYER, supra note 2, at 173.  
 234. See supra notes 55–73 and accompanying text. 
 235. For example, AFP spent nearly $37 million on independent expenditures in the 2012 
election, making it one of the election’s ten biggest spenders. See 2012 Outside Spending, by 
Group, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle= 
2012&chrt=V &disp=O&type=A [https://perma.cc/UQ7S-QANE]. 
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Further support for the substitutability claim comes from the academy. 
Hogan, again, found that when state contribution limits become 
tighter, groups respond by spending more on independent 
expenditures and issue advertising. 236  Less conventional campaign 
finance, that is, leads to more quasi campaign finance. 
The McConnell Court, too, embraced the logic that Congress may 
restrict electioneering communication to prevent groups from evading 
the (then-applicable) ban on express advocacy by corporations and 
unions. Surveying the era before BCRA, the Court observed that 
electioneering communication “accomplished the same purposes as 
express advocacy,” and thus “enabled unions, corporations, and 
wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was 
intended to provide.” 237  More generally, the Court held that the 
potential replacement of one form of campaign finance by another is a 
valid reason to regulate them both. “[I]nterests” that are “sufficient to 
justify” certain limits also vindicate “laws preventing the 
circumvention of such limits.”238 
Once more, though, this position did not survive the Court’s 
subsequent decision in Wisconsin Right to Life. In that case, the Court 
pointed out that campaign finance restrictions are prophylactic, since 
most electoral money is not corruptive or otherwise invidious.239 The 
Court then noted that efforts to prevent restrictions from being 
circumvented, through the transfer of funds from one use to another, 
are prophylactic as well. 240  “[S]uch a prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis 
approach to regulating expression,” the Court concluded, “is not 
consistent with strict scrutiny.”241 The multiple layers of prevention are 
overkill for achieving any governmental interest. 
Also undermining the argument for equal legal status due to 
substitutability is that quasi and ordinary campaign finance may not, in 
fact, be very good substitutes. If they were suitable alternatives, then 
one would expect to see similar amounts of each activity at all times. 
There would be no reason for funders to prefer one activity over the 
 
 236. See Hogan, supra note 12, at 900–01. 
 237. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 131 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010); see id. at 129 (noting that, before BCRA, “political parties and candidates used 
the availability of so-called issue ads to circumvent FECA’s limitations”). 
 238. Id. at 144; see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 
(2001) (“[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”). 
 239. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007). 
 240. See id. 
 241. Id. 
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other if they could be swapped without much loss of effectiveness. In 
reality, however, Professor Richard Hasen discovered a huge 
imbalance when he examined issue advertising during the periods 
before two federal elections.242 The vast majority of commercials were 
sham issue ads—that is, electoral ads—and only a tiny fraction were 
true issue ads underwritten by quasi campaign finance.243 A perusal of 
AFP’s library of commercials paints the same picture. 244  When an 
election is near, most of the spots are electoral; when no vote is 
imminent, the ads typically mention issues but not candidates. 245 
Despite Charles Koch’s comments, AFP thus exhibits clear 
preferences about when to use quasi and regular campaign finance. It 
does not behave as if the activities are interchangeable. 
A final concern about the substitutability argument is that it may 
sweep too broadly. This worry arises because quasi campaign finance 
is not the only partial substitute for conventional campaign finance. 
The direct lobbying of elected officials, the publication of reports by 
think tanks, mass communications with voters that do not rely on 
electoral mechanisms—all these activities serve the ends of those who 
supply electoral funding, more or less well, and so could replace that 
funding if it were limited, more or less effectively. Consider again the 
multitudinous efforts of the Koch network, which span quasi and 
ordinary campaign finance, the lobbying of state and federal officials, 
support for the sixty-plus conservative think tanks in the State Policy 
Network (“SPN”), and backing for the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (“ALEC”), the country’s main supplier of right-wing 
legislative language. 246  If the Koch network’s quasi and regular 
campaign finance were curtailed, it would likely devote more resources 
to lobbying, to SPN’s think tanks, and to ALEC’s draft bills. These 
activities could therefore be curbed themselves, on an anti-
 
 242. See Hasen, supra note 41, at 1795–99 (studying the 1998 and 2000 elections, both of which 
preceded BCRA). 
 243. Specifically, true issue ads made up about 7 percent of ads in 1998, and 2 percent in 2000. 
See id. at 1796. 
 244. See Americans for Prosperity, YOUTUBE, https://m.youtube.com/user/AforP/videos 
[https://perma.cc/7Y4N-7JRE] (last updated Aug. 2020).  
 245. See id. 
 246. For detailed discussions of the Koch network, see generally HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra 
note 162, Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, and Vogel, Koch Network, supra note 59. 
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circumvention theory, but that is just the problem. The theory drags 
too much speech from public discourse into the electoral domain.247 
3. Anti-Corruption.  The above rationales for treating quasi and 
conventional campaign finance symmetrically did not involve the 
governmental interests that might justify their regulation. I now turn to 
these interests, starting with the most doctrinally prominent of them, 
the prevention of corruption.248 The Supreme Court’s understanding of 
corruption has famously fluctuated.249 Around the time of Buckley and 
then again in recent years, the Court conceived of corruption narrowly, 
as explicit quid pro quo exchanges and nothing more.250 In the 1990s 
and early 2000s, in contrast, the Court embraced a broader notion of 
corruption encompassing funders’ undue access to, and influence over, 
elected officials.251 
Under either of these definitions, could quasi campaign finance be 
corruptive (in which case it could be restricted to prevent the 
corruption from occurring)? Certainly. Nonelectoral, yet still political, 
spending has at least some value for candidates. Because its value is 
not zero, candidates might plausibly do something in return for the 
spending. If that something is a specific act tied overtly to the spending, 
then we have a classic quid pro quo—a transaction even the current 
Court would think corrupt. If the something is a little subtler, like 
greater contact with, or responsiveness to, the payors of the quasi 
campaign finance, then today’s Court would be unperturbed—but the 
rest of us need not be. Like the Court of the 1990s and early 2000s, we 
 
 247. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 203, at 688 (“[G]rim efforts to close down every ‘loophole’ 
in campaign finance laws will inevitably trench unacceptably far upon current conceptions of 
freedom of political speech.”). 
 248. According to the contemporary Court, indeed, this is the “only one legitimate 
governmental interest for restricting campaign finances.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206 
(2014) (plurality opinion).  
 249. See, e.g., id. at 208 (“[W]e have not always spoken about corruption in a clear or 
consistent voice.” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 447 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part))).  
 250. See, e.g., id. at 207 (“Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid pro 
quo’ corruption.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam) (“To the extent that 
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office 
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined.”). 
 251. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153–54 (2003) (holding that the “sale of access” 
and “undue influence” are “[j]ust as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo 
corruption”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (recognizing “a concern not confined to bribery of public 
officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of 
large contributors”). 
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could deem it corrupt when these payors enjoy access and influence 
that ordinary voters do not.252 
Suppose, for example, that Steyer’s NextGen America is 
considering spending $1 million in a congressional district to inform 
voters about climate change and to urge them to support policies to 
mitigate it. Suppose, too, that the Democratic candidate in this district 
believes this spending would increase her odds of being elected, and so 
promises Steyer to vote for anti-climate change legislation if NextGen 
America opens its coffers. This would be a quid pro quo that virtually 
everybody would label a corrupt exchange. Imagine, instead, that the 
Democratic candidate makes no explicit pledges, but still meets 
repeatedly with Steyer, echoes NextGen America’s rhetoric, and 
eventually votes for the group’s preferred bills. The current Court 
would no longer be alarmed, but other observers might reasonably 
object to “politicians too compliant with the wishes of large [funders],” 
as a different Court described corruption in 2000.253  
It is worth stressing just how untroubled today’s Court would be 
by this scenario. In Citizens United, the Court held that independent 
electoral expenditures cannot “give rise to corruption.” 254  This is 
because these expenditures allegedly “do not lead to . . . quid pro quo 
corruption,” and “there is only scant evidence that [they] even 
ingratiate.” 255  “Ingratiation and access, in any event, are not 
corruption.”256 It is indisputable, given this reasoning, that the current 
Court would not find nonelectoral spending to be corruptive either. If 
expenditures about elections necessarily do not corrupt, there is no way 
that spending about nonelectoral issues could be invidious. 
As a predictive matter, this is true enough. Today’s Court would 
not agree that quasi campaign finance could ever be corruptive. 
Logically, though, this position is untenable. Nonelectoral, yet still 
political, spending could plainly be the funder’s quid that is traded for 
the politician’s quo. Since quasi campaign finance benefits the 
politician to at least some extent, she might be willing to swap 
 
 252. As Justice Kennedy noted in McConnell (albeit disapprovingly), under the broader 
definition of corruption, “Congress would have the authority to outlaw even pure issue ads, 
because they, too, could endear their sponsors to candidates who adopt the favored positions.” 
540 U.S. at 329 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 253. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 389. 
 254. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 255. Id. at 360. 
 256. Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 359 (“The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to 
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt . . . .”).  
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something for it. Even more clearly, nonelectoral spending could result 
in greater access and influence for its funder. This is not corruption, 
according to the current Court, but that is just its ipse dixit. It is 
corruption according to many others, including this Court’s own 
predecessors.257 
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that quasi campaign finance is 
less valuable to candidates, dollar for dollar, than other kinds of 
funding. Compare a given sum of quasi campaign finance, of 
independent electoral expenditures, and of campaign contributions. 
This dollar amount would be most prized by candidates when it takes 
the form of donations that they may use as they please, based on their 
own assessments of their races. The pool of money would be somewhat 
less helpful as independent electoral spending that reiterates 
candidates’ messages but is not under their direct control.258 And the 
funding would be least desirable as independent nonelectoral spending 
that is both beyond candidates’ control and not aimed directly at 
electing them. 
The upshot is that quasi campaign finance cannot be as corruptive 
as regular campaign finance. It can provide some benefit to candidates, 
so its ability to tempt them from their duties is not nil. But this capacity 
is limited, compared to independent electoral expenditures and, 
especially, campaign contributions, by the weaker dollar-for-dollar 
punch of nonelectoral spending. Rational candidates would therefore 
be less likely to exchange access and influence, let alone outright 
promises, for quasi campaign finance. Even if they did make such deals, 
they probably would not be willing to part with as much. A smaller quid 
would merit, at most, a similarly minor quo.259 
 
 257. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem . . . and the Buckley Problem, 73 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 949, 994 (2005) (“[I]ndependent expenditures provide candidates with sufficient 
benefit that they are grateful for the expenditures and inclined to reward the independent 
spenders with preferential access, if not government decisions . . . .”); supra note 251 and 
accompanying text.  
 258. As the Buckley Court observed, “[I]ndependent expenditures may well provide little 
assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.” Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam). See also, e.g., Kang, supra note 143, at 44 (“Even if 
independent expenditures are valuable to candidates and parties, contributions are better dollar 
for dollar.”). 
 259. See supra note 250. Probably for this reason, there is no evidence that grassroots lobbying 
is linked to corruption. “[T]here is not a demonstrated or widely accepted connection between 
spending on such efforts and improper actions by the government officials ultimately contacted.” 
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics and the Public’s Right To Know, 13 ELECTION L.J. 138, 157–58 
(2014).  
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One more (by now familiar260) point about the argument that quasi 
and conventional finance warrant the same legal status because they 
may both be corruptive: this claim does not distinguish quasi campaign 
finance from other types of political communications that may also be 
useful to candidates. Take a think tank report that praises a politician’s 
proposal or bashes her opponent’s ideas. Or a draft bill provided to a 
legislator, which she may then introduce and thereby cement her 
reputation as a policy entrepreneur. These materials have at least some 
value for candidates, who may agree, for that reason, to trade 
something for them. But if we brand these transactions as corrupt—
and, consequently, authorize the regulation of the potentially 
corruptive materials—then we have again expanded the electoral 
domain beyond any sensible boundary. We have again allowed it to 
swallow much of public discourse. 
4. Anti-Distortion.  Another harm that many have linked to 
ordinary campaign finance is the distortion of public opinion. Electoral 
expenditures, on this view, may affect voters’ candidate preferences, 
shifting them from what they would have been had there been equal, 
less, or no spending. In Justice Wiley Rutledge’s words in a 1948 case, 
“large expenditures” may “bring about an undue, that is . . . a 
disproportionate sway, of electoral sentiment.”261 The prevention of 
such distortion may thus be a legitimate governmental interest that 
justifies the restriction of regular campaign finance. As the Supreme 
Court put it in the 1990 case of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, a law may validly target “the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth” on the electorate.262 
Quasi campaign finance could plausibly skew public opinion in the 
same ways as conventional campaign finance. In particular, when 
voters are persuaded by nonelectoral spending, their revised views 
 
 260. See supra notes 227–29, 246–247 and accompanying text. 
 261. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (summarizing, 
but not agreeing with, the government’s position in the case); see also, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens 
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (discussing “the corrosive influence of concentrated 
corporate wealth” on “the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas”); United States v. UAW, 
352 U.S. 567, 582 (1957) (noting “the corroding effect of money employed in elections by 
aggregated power”). 
 262. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also, e.g., David Cole, First Amendment Antitrust: The End of 
Laissez-Faire in Campaign Finance, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 236, 238–39 (1991) (praising the 
Austin Court for upholding “limited government intervention designed to correct the distorting 
effects of corporate wealth”). 
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could be considered distorted. In this case, the views are not what they 
would have been had the spending not occurred. Even when quasi 
campaign finance merely heightens the salience of certain issues, the 
result could be seen as distortion. Here, too, the pattern of voters’ 
attention differs from how it would have looked in the absence of the 
activity. 
These effects, moreover, are exactly what spenders on quasi 
campaign finance want. Through their expenditures, they hope to 
change voters’ minds and to get them to focus more on particular 
policies. If the payors were to fail to sway public opinion, they would 
surely be disappointed. An adviser to Charles Koch, for instance, has 
said that he “see[s] politicians [not] as setting the prevalent ideology 
but as reflecting it.” 263  “This explain[s] the Kochs’ political modus 
operandi”: trying to mold the mass ideology that politicians will then 
mirror. 264  The political director of Steyer’s NextGen America, 
similarly, has remarked that the group seeks to “make a real 
connection” with voters about “how climate hits them at the household 
level.”265 If voters’ attitudes about the environment were unaltered by 
the group’s communications, these messages would be judged 
unsuccessful.  
Unfortunately for Koch and Steyer, quasi campaign finance does 
not appear to influence voters’ views significantly.266 As I explained 
earlier, this could be because public opinion is generally quite difficult 
to move.267 Or it could be because most nonelectoral communications 
are directed at higher socioeconomic-status individuals who make up a 
relatively narrow slice of the electorate.268 Whatever the reason, the 
empirical case for regulating quasi campaign finance because of its 
distortive impact is weak. Nonelectoral messages simply do not seem 
to cause much distortion. Accordingly, the governmental interest in 
unskewing public opinion—in restoring it to the configuration it would 
otherwise have exhibited—cannot be very compelling. There is no 
urgent need to solve a problem that isn’t there. 
 
 263. DANIEL SCHULMAN, SONS OF WICHITA: HOW THE KOCH BROTHERS BECAME 
AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND PRIVATE DYNASTY 255 (2014) (ebook).  
 264. Id.  
 265. Evan Halper, Climate Change a Wedge Issue in 2014? Billionaire Tom Steyer Hopes So, 
L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014, 9:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-pn-steyer-
20140521-story.html [https://perma.cc/ED8M-77S3].  
 266. See supra notes 144–48148 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
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But suppose there is a problem. Suppose that quasi campaign 
finance is capable of materially shifting voters’ attitudes. Even then, it 
is hard to call this distortion unless one can first identify an undistorted 
baseline: a normatively attractive benchmark to which the status quo 
may be compared. What this baseline should be, however, is far from 
clear. Should it be a world where AFP and NextGen America do not 
spend any money at all? One where they spend as much as every other 
political organization? One where they do not outspend other groups 
by more than a certain multiple? Or, as the Court suggested in Austin, 
one where their resources are proportional to the popularity of their 
ideas? 269  There is obviously no consensus on the correct answer. 
Without agreement, though, it borders on the incoherent to speak of 
distortion. Distortion is inherently a relative concept, one that 
condemns a state of affairs for deviating from some ideal. If we do not 
know the ideal, then we also do not know how far—or even whether—
the status quo diverges from it.270 
But assume away this objection as well. Assume, in other words, 
that quasi campaign finance does change voters’ preferences, and that 
we can measure the resulting gap between actual and undistorted 
public opinion. A further difficulty remains: the slippery slope from 
quasi campaign finance to other forms of political expression that may 
also affect how voters think. Without more evidence, it is uncertain 
how long this slide is—that is, how much more speech has an impact on 
public opinion and so may be labeled distortive. But if we are positing 
(against the weight of the available facts 271 ) that quasi campaign 
finance skews voters’ stances, it is only reasonable to imagine that 
many other messages are similarly influential: fundraising solicitations, 
white papers, fact and opinion journalism, and so on.272 All of this 
communication, then, could be regulated on the same anti-distortive 
basis as quasi campaign finance. As Chief Justice John Roberts 
 
 269. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (endorsing the idea “that 
expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by [campaign 
spenders]”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 270. For other scholars criticizing the concept of distortion on this basis, see POST, supra note 
17, at 53 (“There is thus no ‘baseline’ from which ‘distortion’ can be assessed.”) and Lillian R. 
BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance 
Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1078 (1985) (“‘Distortion,’ of course, implies a norm, but 
reformers scarcely describe or defend the norm upon which they rely.”). 
 271. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
 272. For a recent study supporting this assumption, see Gregory J. Martin & Ali Yurukoglu, 
Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 2565, 2565–66 (2017) 
(finding that Fox News viewership leads to a higher likelihood of Republican voting). 
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observed in Citizens United, “[t]he First Amendment theory 
underlying Austin’s holding” might “authorize government prohibition 
of political speech” even “outside the original context of corporate 
advocacy.”273 
Lastly, for those who are impressed by doctrinal points, it is 
relevant that Citizens United did not just criticize the anti-distortion 
interest invoked in Austin and other cases. Rather, Citizens United held 
that this justification is categorically forbidden: an “aberration” that 
“interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas” and enables 
“censorship . . . vast in its reach.” 274  The claim that quasi and 
conventional campaign finance should be treated symmetrically 
because of their distortive potential must therefore grapple with a 
contrary Court ruling in addition to the other issues noted above. 
5. Alignment.  A final reason to regulate ordinary campaign 
finance, which I and other scholars have explored elsewhere,275 is the 
promotion of alignment between voters’ preferences and the 
government’s outputs. On this account, the actions that elected officials 
take, especially the policies they implement, should be congruent with 
the desires of the electorate. Empirically, however, unrestricted 
electoral funding is a powerful driver of misalignment. 276  It causes 
legislators’ voting records and enacted laws to reflect the funders’ 
priorities while straying from those of regular constituents. 277 
Therefore, the argument continues, the government has an interest in 
limiting electoral funding in order to better align what voters want with 
what the state does. Such restraints advance the democratic goal of a 
polity that heeds the will of the people. 
This logic extends to quasi campaign finance. As I showed earlier, 
there is considerable evidence that nonelectoral, yet still political, 
spending pushes the government’s outputs in the directions favored by 
the spenders, but not necessarily by voters. Grassroots contacts with 
 
 273. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 381 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 274. Id. at 354–55 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 
(2008)). 
 275. See generally Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24 (emphasizing 
that an interest “of the gravest importance” is the alignment “between voters’ policy preferences 
and their government’s policy outputs”); Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, supra note 
178 (same); Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2014) (same).  
 276. See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1467–79. 
 277. See id.  
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legislators paid for by quasi campaign finance, for example, make them 
significantly more likely to vote for the bills being advocated, 
regardless of the bills’ popularity with their constituents.278 Likewise, 
the greater the state-level activity of AFP—the country’s most prolific 
spender on quasi campaign finance—the more probable it is that a state 
curtails public-sector union bargaining rights and declines to expand 
Medicaid.279 By comparison, “variations in public views ha[ve] little 
relevance” to the adoption of these policies, which are “as readily 
enacted in states . . . where people express[] high levels of support . . . 
as they [are] in states . . . where people [are] much less supportive.”280 
If the misalignment produced by conventional campaign finance 
can justify its regulation, then, arguably, so can that yielded by quasi 
campaign finance. The reasoning is identical for the latter activity. 
Nonelectoral, yet still political, spending drives a wedge between 
voters’ preferences and the government’s outputs. This noncongruence 
is troubling from a democratic perspective. Accordingly, the state may 
intervene to prevent the noncongruence from arising. Through its 
intervention, the state furthers its compelling interest in a properly 
aligned political system. 
The argument that quasi and ordinary campaign finance should be 
equated because of their misaligning potential, moreover, avoids two 
of the pitfalls of the analogous claim about their distortive capacity. 
First, the misaligning potential, unlike the distortive capacity, is real. 
Empirically, quasi campaign finance does appear to induce elected 
officials to behave in ways opposed by their constituents,281 while it 
does not seem to exert much influence on public opinion.282 Second, 
the dilemma of how to choose a baseline relative to which distortion 
may be measured does not exist for misalignment. Unlike distortion, 
misalignment comes with a normatively attractive benchmark built in: 
voters’ attitudes on specific issues and overarching ideologies. They are 
the reference point for determining whether, and how far, the 
government’s outputs have diverged from where they ought to be.283 
 
 278. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text. 
 280. Skocpol & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 21, at 694. 
 281. See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. 
 283. There are still some baseline-setting issues, however, with the alignment approach. See 
Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance, supra note 24, at 1434–41 (discussing them in 
detail); Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, supra note 178, at 304–13 (same).  
STEPHANOPOULOS IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:50 PM 
392  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:333 
However, the argument based on misaligning potential remains 
vulnerable to the slippery-slope objection. Other kinds of political 
communication, beyond quasi and regular campaign finance, are also 
able to create noncongruence between politicians and their 
constituents. In particular, Hertel-Fernandez found that it is not just 
AFP’s strength in a state that drives restrictions on public-sector union 
bargaining rights and refusals to expand Medicaid. Rather, these 
unpopular policies are linked to the clout of the entire Koch network, 
including the reach of ALEC and the budgets of SPN think tanks.284 
This result suggests that the circulation of conservative bills to 
legislators, and the publication of right-wing white papers, could be 
regulated as well on a misalignment theory. But this is a disturbing 
conclusion since these activities have always been viewed as part of 
public discourse. If they are moved to the electoral domain instead, 
then that zone becomes overly capacious, and the public sphere unduly 
narrow. 
Nor has the Supreme Court ever endorsed the argument based on 
misaligning potential. The Court has used some similar language, like 
its passage in McConnell calling it “troubling to a functioning 
democracy” when “officeholders . . . decide issues not on . . . the desires 
of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have 
made large financial contributions.” 285  But the Court has never 
explicitly held that the promotion of alignment is a legitimate 
governmental interest that may justify some restriction of political 
speech. To date, it is only scholars who have advanced this position.  
C. Other Assignments 
Whether to assign quasi campaign finance to the electoral domain 
or to public discourse, then, is quite a difficult question. There are 
sensible reasons to pair quasi and conventional campaign finance: they 
share several functional features and so may be substituted for each 
other, and they are both capable of corrupting officeholders, distorting 
public opinion, and misaligning the government’s outputs from voters’ 
preferences. On the other hand, even if slippery-slope claims are often 
 
 284. See HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, supra note 162, at 182 (looking at public-sector union 
bargaining rights); id. at 202 (Medicaid expansion); see also Hertel-Fernandez, Skocpol & Lynch, 
supra note 4, at 254 (same).  
 285. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010); see also, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (discussing 
“the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors”—and 
not compliant enough with their constituents’ desires). 
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overstated,286 they have real force here. If quasi campaign finance may 
be placed in the electoral domain—despite being nonelectoral by 
definition—then so, perhaps, may be even more political speech. But 
then the public sphere starts to shrink beyond recognition. 
1. Regulable Public Discourse.  Are there classificatory options for 
quasi campaign finance that are not so fraught? There are at least two 
other possibilities, but they pose their own problems. The first of these 
is situating quasi campaign finance in public discourse—but not 
deeming it unregulable due to this location. It is true that governmental 
restrictions of public discourse are usually unconstitutional because 
they interfere with the free formation of public opinion. As the Court 
has declared, the First Amendment “is designed and intended to 
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion.” 287  “[G]overnmental regulation of this crucial process” 
therefore cannot “be exercised consistent with First Amendment 
guarantees.”288 
However, some prominent theories of public discourse would 
allow some limitation of quasi campaign finance. For instance, 
Professor Owen Fiss (echoing philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn289) 
has argued that the point of public discourse is not to safeguard 
individual autonomy but rather to “allow[] people to [deliberate] 
intelligently and freely, aware of all the options and in possession of all 
the relevant information.” 290  Public discourse should thus be 
“protected when (and only when)” it “enrich[es] public debate,” not 
“because it is an exercise of autonomy.”291 From this perspective, quasi 
campaign finance could be regulated so long as the regulation resulted 
in a more informed populace better able to make judgments on public 
issues. This is certainly conceivable. Say that a package of 
interventions 292  yielded somewhat less libertarian spending by the 
Koch network, and somewhat more communication advocating higher 
 
 286. See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1026 (2003) (noting the weaknesses of many slippery-slope claims). 
 287. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). 
 288. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); see also, e.g., POST, supra 
note 17, at 74 (“[C]ourts may properly prevent the state from restricting public discourse . . . .”). 
 289. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 32, at 25 (“What is essential is not that everyone shall 
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”). 
 290. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986). 
 291. Id. at 1411. 
 292. For a discussion of potential regulations of quasi campaign finance, see infra Part III. 
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taxes and greater redistribution. Presented with more balanced 
information, people might have more illuminating exchanges about 
these topics and, ultimately, reach better decisions about them. In this 
case, the interventions would further the mission of public discourse, 
not undermine it. 
Alternatively, Post has claimed that we value public discourse 
because it is a source of “democratic legitimation.”293 When people 
“participate in the ongoing dialogue that constitutes public opinion,” 
they come to “believe that government is potentially responsive to 
their views.” 294  These subjective feelings of responsiveness cause 
“government [to] enjoy democratic legitimacy [because] it carries the 
trust and confidence of its people.” 295  On this theory, too, the 
regulation of quasi campaign finance could be allowed if it bolstered 
people’s faith in government. And again, this scenario is plausible on 
its face. People might feel less alienated from government—more 
confident that government is listening to them—if a handful of 
billionaires were not able to dominate quasi campaign finance with 
their idiosyncratic messages. People might be even more sure that 
government is responsive to their views if they were offered grants to 
make these views known. This subsidization of quasi campaign finance 
is one of the regulatory options I address below in Part III.296 
Both of these accounts of public discourse, though, require us to 
believe in the state’s competence and good faith. According to Fiss, 
who decides if a limit on quasi campaign finance will enrich the public 
debate? In Post’s model, who makes the call that a restriction will 
enhance people’s feelings of responsiveness? The answer in both cases 
is the government.297 But the government might be bad at these jobs; it 
might misjudge regulations’ implications for the vibrancy of public 
 
 293. POST, supra note 17, at 49. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See infra Part III. Even though Post believes that public discourse is generally 
unregulable, see POST, supra note 17, at 74, he concedes that limits are valid if “uncontrolled 
expenditures threaten to undermine the electoral integrity of our representative system.” Id. at 
91. In this case, “we also face a potential loss of democratic legitimation if we choose to do 
nothing.” Id.; see also James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An 
Introduction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1093 (2002) (pointing out that public discourse could be 
regulated if doing so “would result in a net gain in legitimation”).  
 297. Fiss is quite open about his view that “the state can enrich as much as it constricts public 
debate.” Fiss, supra note 290, at 1415. Likewise, Post explains that “government regulations” can 
“advance the goal of sustaining public confidence that elections select officials who are attentive 
to public opinion.” POST, supra note 17, at 91. 
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debate or for people’s subjective attitudes. Even worse, the 
government might not approach these tasks benevolently; instead, it 
might use its jurisdiction over public discourse to exclude certain 
categories of speakers or speech. If, as the Court has said, the First 
Amendment is “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power,”298 we 
might reasonably worry about conceptions of public discourse that ask 
us to accept the state’s skill and goodwill. 
Furthermore, there is another understanding of public discourse—
probably the dominant understanding in the doctrine—that focuses 
above all on people’s freedom to participate in it. What really matters, 
on this view, is people’s “liberty to discuss publicly . . . all matters of 
public concern,” 299  not whether this discussion ultimately results in 
richer public debate or greater democratic legitimation. This theory 
plainly would not authorize restraints on quasi campaign finance. Yes, 
such curbs might have consequences that some would think desirable. 
But these positive effects would be beside the point. No ends could 
justify means that abridge anyone’s ability to engage in public 
discourse. 
2. A Policymaking Domain.  The second classificatory possibility 
is to assign quasi campaign finance neither to the electoral domain nor 
to public discourse, but rather to a different specialized sphere: one 
dedicated to the formulation and implementation of governmental 
policy. Courts and scholars have not previously recognized a 
policymaking domain, but one may readily be imagined. Its 
instrumental purpose would be the enactment of sound laws and 
regulations—measures that promote the public’s welfare and reflect its 
preferences. This is a different goal from that of public discourse, 
whether it is conceived in Fiss’s, Post’s, or the Court’s usual terms. This 
is also an inherently governmental objective since only the state may 
ratify legally binding policy. This governmental nature is important 
because, under the partitionist theory, only the state’s valid aims may 
justify the creation of specialized domains separate from public 
discourse.300 
 
 298. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 299. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940); see also, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 
391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) (noting the “public interest in having free and unhindered debate on 
matters of public importance”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[A] major purpose 
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”). 
 300. See supra notes 192–208 and accompanying text (discussing the partitionist theory). 
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Strong evidence that a policymaking domain already (implicitly) 
exists comes from the procedures used in legislation and regulation. In 
an assembly, legislators and witnesses called to testify cannot speak 
whenever they want, for as long as they wish, or on whatever topics 
they like. Rather, their speech is comprehensively controlled by 
recognition requirements, time limits, and germaneness conditions.301 
This is so even though the speech is quintessentially political. Likewise, 
parties interested in expressing their views on draft regulations are not 
free to contact agencies whenever and however they choose. Instead, 
they must comply with rules restricting their comments to certain time 
periods and insisting on the disclosure of identifying information.302 
This, again, despite the classically political character of the 
communication. 
Quasi campaign finance, then, could be placed in a policymaking 
domain along with legislative and regulatory speech. Like those types 
of messages, nonelectoral, yet still political, spending seeks the 
enactment or amendment of laws or regulations. Indeed, that is its 
whole point, and what distinguishes it from electoral spending. With 
quasi campaign finance, policy change (or preservation) is the overt 
goal, and elections are the indirect mechanism used to achieve it. The 
legal ramifications of this designation would also be far-reaching. If 
quasi campaign finance were part of a specialized policymaking sphere, 
then it could be managed in the service of the sphere’s purpose: the 
production of good public policy. Various kinds of checks might then 
become valid, even if they would be unlawful for generic public 
discourse. 
Yet there is at least one significant difference between quasi 
campaign finance and legislative and regulatory speech. The latter are 
directed at policymakers—fellow legislators and agency 
administrators, respectively—while nonelectoral, yet still political, 
spending necessarily targets voters.303 Voters, however, do not make 
decisions in our system, at least outside the context of ballot initiatives. 
Quasi campaign finance may therefore be an awkward fit for a 
 
 301. See, e.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116th Cong., Rule XVI (2019), 
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/YQU2-PJAN].  
 302. Although different agencies follow different commenting procedures, they all impose 
restrictions in fulfilling their obligation to “give interested persons an opportunity to participate 
in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) 
(2018). 
 303. See supra Part I.A. 
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policymaking domain since those who run the domain are not its 
audience. Rather, those managers are reached only through the 
intervening steps of the constituents who actually receive the 
communications. 
It is also notable that legislative speech is subject to much more 
draconian limits than regulatory speech. This is probably because 
legislative speech takes place under conditions of scarcity while 
regulatory speech does not.304 With legislative speech, there is only so 
much time to hear from speakers on the assembly floor, whereas with 
regulatory speech, the agency can process all the comments that are 
submitted. Of the two, quasi campaign finance more closely resembles 
regulatory speech. More ads can always be aired; more canvassers can 
always go door to door; more rallies can always be held. One actor’s 
nonelectoral spending does not necessarily come at the expense of 
another’s. In that case, though, the restrictions applicable to regulatory 
speech are more indicative of the constraints that could be imposed on 
quasi campaign finance if it were assigned to a policymaking domain. 
And those restrictions are not particularly onerous—certainly a far cry 
from Robert’s Rules of Order. 
The slippery-slope objection must make one last appearance as 
well. If quasi campaign finance may be situated in a policymaking 
domain, despite not being directed at policymakers or occurring under 
conditions of scarcity, then so may be fundraising solicitations, think 
tank reports, editorials, and so on. All of these messages, too, have 
policy aspirations, are heard by audiences other than legislators and 
regulators, and may be conveyed without cannibalizing other views. 
But if a policymaking domain is elastic enough to fit these kinds of 
political communication, then not enough space is left for public 
discourse. Once more, a realm of specialized speech ends up annexing 
large swathes of the public sphere. 
III.  THE REGULATION OF QUASI CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
In the preceding Part, I considered whether quasi campaign 
finance may constitutionally be regulated. Under the partitionist 
theory of the First Amendment, the answer hinges largely on the zone 
of speech in which the activity is located. If nonelectoral, yet still 
political, spending is deemed part of a specialized electoral or 
 
 304. Cf. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 367, 376, 400–01 (1969) (upholding 
regulations on broadcasters under the Federal Communications Commission’s “fairness 
doctrine” in part because “broadcast frequencies constitute[] a scarce resource”).  
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policymaking domain, then it may be limited to accomplish the 
domain’s objectives. Conversely, if this sort of spending is situated in 
public discourse, then it is presumptively unregulable, at least per the 
Court’s usual view of generic political communication.  
In this Part, I assume that quasi campaign finance may be 
restricted and turn to the question that logically follows: How should it 
be curbed in order to realize goals like the prevention of corruption, 
distortion, and misalignment and the enactment of sound public 
policy? I address three types of regulations: (1) ceilings on 
nonelectoral, yet still political, spending in the form of contribution or 
expenditure caps; (2) floors for the activity in the form of public 
subsidies; and (3) disclosure requirements for the sources, amounts, 
and uses of quasi campaign finance. Of these three categories, I find 
the latter two preferable: more practical, more consistent with 
American tradition, and still potentially quite effective. As this verdict 
reveals, I also focus on the regulations’ normative appeal while 
commenting on their constitutionality only in passing.  
A. Ceilings 
Beginning with ceilings, both contribution and expenditure limits 
on quasi campaign finance are conceivable. A contribution limit might 
bar a donor from giving more than a certain annual dollar amount to 
an entity that plans to use the funds to pay for mass communications 
“with regard to . . . the formulation, modification, or adoption of . . . 
legislation” or a “rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other 
[governmental] program, policy, or position.”305 The quoted language 
is from the Lobbying Disclosure Act and nicely captures the range of 
nonelectoral, yet still political, issues that could be the subjects of 
messages to voters.306 Analogously, an expenditure limit might bar any 
actor from spending more than a certain yearly sum on mass 
communications about governmental policy. Policy would presumably 
be defined the same way whether the money was disbursed via a 
donation or a direct outlay. 
 
 305. 2 U.S.C. § 1602(8)(A)(i)–(ii) (2018). 
 306. However, the quoted language does not define mass communications with voters, nor 
does it distinguish between mass communications that do and do not rely on electoral mechanisms 
to be effective. See supra Part I.A (defining quasi campaign finance). Any actual legislation would 
have to work out these issues. But they are not my concern here because I want to comment 
generally on contribution and expenditure limits, not take a first pass at drafting them. 
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An initial point about these restrictions is that there is no reason 
to distinguish between contribution and expenditure limits. There is a 
basis for treating these measures differently in the ordinary campaign 
finance context. As the Court held in Buckley, contributions to 
candidates are more valuable to them, and therefore more potentially 
corruptive, than independent electoral expenditures on their behalf.307 
But this logic does not transfer to the quasi campaign finance context. 
This is because donations of nonelectoral money are necessarily made 
to noncandidate entities such as nonprofit groups.308 These entities, of 
course, cannot hold governmental office and so cannot exchange 
official acts (or access or influence) for the money they receive. 
Accordingly, there is no greater risk of corruption when a nonelectoral 
dollar is given to another actor than when it is spent directly. Either 
way, that dollar cannot make its way into a candidate’s coffers.309 
It is also plain that, if they have any teeth, contribution and 
expenditure limits on quasi campaign finance would reduce its volume. 
Some would-be donors would be unable to give as much money as they 
would like to some groups. Similarly, some would-be spenders would 
be prevented from making all of their desired disbursements.310 To the 
extent the current quantity of quasi campaign finance is problematic, 
this decrease would be beneficial. In particular, if the amount of 
spending on nonelectoral politics is correlated with the prevalence of 
corruption, distortion, or misalignment, then less of this spending 
would lead to fewer of these harms. The pool of funding responsible 
for the problems would be partly drained. 
It does not seem to me, however, that the trouble with quasi 
campaign finance is its volume. In fact, extensive communication with 
voters about nonelectoral politics has much to commend it, potentially 
yielding a more informed electorate capable of making better policy 
judgments. In my view, rather, the primary concern is the balance of 
quasi campaign finance: the distribution of messages that are conveyed 
 
 307. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam) (“[I]ndependent advocacy 
. . . does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those 
identified with large campaign contributions.”). 
 308. If the donations were made to candidates, of course, they would no longer be 
nonelectoral. 
 309. Nor is there any reason to think that contributions of quasi campaign finance are more 
distortive or misaligning than expenditures, or vice versa. A nonelectoral dollar that Steyer gives 
to NextGen America seems as impactful as a nonelectoral dollar that he spends himself.  
 310. Cf. Briffault, Lobbying, supra note 223, at 113 (“Capping the amounts an individual or 
group could spend either on hiring a lobbyist or on lobbying personally would cut directly into 
the amount of lobbying . . . .”). 
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to voters. It is when one side of a debate enjoys a large resource 
advantage that fears about corruption, distortion, and misalignment 
become more acute.311 In such an environment, corruptible candidates 
find that most of the quids for which they may promise quos come from 
the same ideological camp. Public opinion is also more likely to be 
skewed when it is pressed hard from one direction but only faintly from 
the other. And if elected officials veer toward the preferences of 
nonelectoral spenders—thereby diverging from what voters want—
they probably veer further when the payors form a mostly unified bloc. 
Contribution and expenditure limits on quasi campaign finance, 
though, are a poor tool for promoting greater communicative 
symmetry. They cannot promise that when the volume of nonelectoral 
spending declines, its composition will be any different. Suppose, for 
example, that a thousand conservative donors each currently give $1 
million a year to the Koch network, and that five hundred liberal 
donors annually write equally sized checks to the Democracy 
Alliance. 312  Next, imagine that a $500,000 limit on quasi campaign 
finance contributions is imposed. If this restriction cannot be 
circumvented, then the Koch network’s and the DA’s budgets both will 
fall by half. But their relative scale will be unaffected. The Koch 
network will continue to spend twice as much as the DA in furtherance 
of its right-wing agenda.313 
The caveat about circumvention is also important. For two 
reasons, ceilings on quasi campaign finance would likely be easier to 
evade than regular campaign finance regulations. First, groups may 
freely multiply, transforming one organization into several, while 
candidates cannot. This means that if limits were levied on 
nonelectoral, yet still political, contributions, groups could sidestep 
them by splitting into a number of new entities. Donors who wanted to 
give amounts above the thresholds could then divide their payments 
among the array of sister organizations.314 In contrast, this option is 
 
 311. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) (suggesting that when 
corporate advocacy “drown[s] out other points of view,” it may “threaten[] imminently to 
undermine democratic processes”).  
 312. This is a reasonable approximation of reality. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying 
text. 
 313. Of course, if there were equal numbers of conservative and liberal donors, then each 
side’s spending would be the same in this hypothetical. But that just means that contribution limits 
could—not that they would—result in spending parity. 
 314. Aggregate limits on total annual quasi campaign finance donations could potentially stop 
this sort of circumvention. See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality 
opinion) (discussing the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates for federal office).  
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unavailable to candidates. They cannot convert from a single seeker of 
office into many.315 Caps on their receipts thus have more bite because 
human beings, unlike artificial entities, are incapable of at-will 
proliferation. 
Second, there are probably more substitutes for nonelectoral than 
for electoral funding. If contribution or expenditure limits were 
enacted for quasi campaign finance, payors could simply switch to a 
number of alternative activities: lobbying officeholders directly, 
underwriting the work of think tanks or university centers, subsidizing 
journalistic coverage, and so on. All of these activities are also 
instruments for pursuing policy goals.316 On the other hand, at least 
before Citizens United, laws and norms blocked those wishing to 
influence elections from fully deploying their resources to this end. 
Laws capped their contributions to candidates, parties, and PACs. And 
norms restrained them from spending much money directly or from 
creating vehicles like super PACs that could make unlimited 
expenditures. 317  For several decades, the dike against excessive 
electoral funding thus held, even though in theory it could have been 
breached the whole time. 
A final strike against contribution or expenditure limits on quasi 
campaign finance is their sheer novelty. There is no modern American 
tradition of restricting nonelectoral, yet still political, speech. To the 
contrary, the Court has a consistent record of striking down such 
constraints.318 Accordingly, even if they were permissible, ceilings on 
quasi campaign finance would likely seem odd and discomfiting to 
many observers. They would be a new feature on the legal landscape, 
and one unlike the terrain’s current profile. 
 
 315. See id. at 201–02 (describing the FEC regulations that prevent candidates from benefiting 
from single-candidate committees or from funds given to other entities but earmarked for them). 
Federal law also “prohibit[s] donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political 
committees,” thus blocking the spread of PACs to some degree. Id. at 201 (emphasis added) 
(citing 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (2012); 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(g)(4) (2012)). An equivalent anti-
proliferation rule could be imagined for groups engaging in quasi campaign finance. 
 316. The ready availability of these activities, of course, is what gives force to the slippery-
slope objection to regulating quasi campaign finance. See supra Parts II.B–C. 
 317. See, e.g., Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Why 
Hasn’t Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 112 (2013) (showing the 
lower (though still rising) share of campaign funding by the wealthy prior to Citizens United).  
 318. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310, 369 (2010) (“Congress has no power to ban lobbying itself.”); Briffault, Anxiety, supra 
note 45, at 164 (“[L]imits on lobbying expenditures, like limits on campaign expenditures, would 
run straight into the First Amendment.”).  
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B. Floors 
Say that ceilings are a bad idea, here, because they do not 
necessarily change the distribution of nonelectoral spending, they are 
easy to circumvent, and they are legally unfamiliar. What about floors, 
by which I mean public subsidies for quasi campaign finance? Such 
subsidies could be configured in many ways, so to anchor the 
discussion, I consider only one of them: a voucher program under 
which each eligible voter would receive a small annual sum (for 
example, $100), which could then be spent directly on nonelectoral 
politics or donated to a group that would deploy it for this purpose. 
Scholars have long urged this sort of program in the conventional 
campaign finance context, 319  and Seattle recently became the first 
jurisdiction to enact it. 320  I envision the same policy in the quasi 
campaign finance context—except that no strings would be attached to 
the vouchers. Eligible voters would not have to do anything to get 
them, nor groups to be their recipients, beyond using them for quasi 
campaign finance.321 
Vouchers along these lines could reduce the risk of corruption by 
adding many small nonelectoral spenders to the few big payors who 
currently predominate. Take the hypothetical Democratic candidate in 
the congressional district where NextGen America may spend $1 
million to combat climate change.322 As noted above, this candidate has 
a considerable incentive to promise quos—official acts, access, 
influence—in return for this large quid. 323  But now assume that 
vouchers are available and will result in an additional $1 million in 
quasi campaign finance, paid for by dozens of groups and thousands of 
voters. In this scenario, the candidate would have less reason to enter 
 
 319. See generally, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 26 (proposing a voucher system for 
electoral donations); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public 
Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1996) (same). Scholars have 
also supported public financing in the direct lobbying context. See, e.g., Dorie Apollonio, Bruce 
E. Cain & Lee Drutman, Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond the Corruption Paradigm, 36 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 46 (2008); Brian Galle, Charities in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1561 (2013); Gerken & Tausanovitch, supra note 223, at 87–90. 
 320. See Democracy Voucher Program, supra note 27. 
 321. In the conventional campaign finance context, voucher programs typically require 
candidates to agree to a series of conditions in order to qualify for donations. See, e.g., Democracy 
Voucher Program—I am a Candidate, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/democracyvoucher/ 
i-am-a-candidate [https://perma.cc/SR3C-3B4X] (noting that, to participate, Seattle candidates 
must collect a number of qualifying contributions and signatures and abide by spending limits). 
 322. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 323. See id. 
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into a corrupt transaction with NextGen America. Its potential 
spending would still be valuable but would no longer carry the same 
weight after being equaled by the voucher-enabled payments. Nor 
would the candidate be motivated to make corrupt deals with the 
holders or recipients of the vouchers. Their individual quids would be 
too minor to warrant quos. 
That this regime could limit distortion is even clearer. In a setting 
where NextGen America is the only major spender on nonelectoral 
politics, its environmental message might skew public opinion, in the 
sense of shifting it from what it would have been absent the spending. 
But if NextGen America’s advocacy were supplemented by many more 
voices—some sympathetic, others hostile, and still others advancing 
unrelated positions—people’s views would likely be more resistant to 
change. Public opinion would then be shaped by an array of 
perspectives, not pushed inexorably in the same direction by a single 
actor. 
Quasi campaign finance vouchers could improve alignment as 
well. When NextGen America is the main nonelectoral spender, 
politicians may feel pressure to back its preferred policies. If these 
policies are more liberal than most voters would like, then a gap may 
emerge between the electorate’s views and representatives’ positions. 
But if quasi campaign finance were paid for by groups and voters across 
the ideological spectrum, then politicians’ calculations might be quite 
different. In that case, they might stop parroting NextGen America’s 
stances and start reflecting the attitudes, now backed by the vouchers, 
of the general public. 
A common objection to all public financing proposals is cost. 
There are more than 200 million eligible voters in the United States,324 
so if 10 percent of them (likely a generous estimate325) were to use a 
$100 voucher each year, the program’s annual price tag would be 
around $2 billion. This is real money, though still a pittance in the 
 
 324. See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2018, Table 1:  
Reported Voting and Registration, by Sex and Single Years of Age: November 2018, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-
registration/p20-583.html [https://perma.cc/MD5K-9EM5]  
(reporting almost 229 million American citizens over the age of eighteen). 
 325. In Seattle, only 3.3 percent of residents used their vouchers in the 2017 election. See 
Sarah Kliff, Seattle’s Radical Plan To Fight Big Money in Politics, VOX (Nov. 5, 2018), https:/
/www.vox.com/2018/11/5/17058970/seattle-democracy-vouchers [https://perma.cc/3CFE-H6DJ]. 
A low voucher use rate raises the issue of representativeness: voucher users might be different 
(older, whiter, wealthier) than eligible voters, in which case vouchers might be less effective at 
preventing distortion and misalignment.  
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context of a federal budget now approaching $4.5 trillion.326 Also recall 
that the best estimate of the existing volume of quasi campaign finance 
is about $1 billion per year.327 This means that, at the price of a tiny 
fraction of the federal budget, public financing of nonelectoral politics 
could roughly double its private financing. Public funds could thus 
drown out private funds in this area—and, with them, the democratic 
harms they sometimes cause. 
Quasi campaign finance vouchers might also raise First 
Amendment hackles because they would subsidize some speech 
(nonelectoral, yet still political, communication) but not other speech 
(electoral messages, non-political messages, and so on). 328  But this 
differentiation would not be on the basis of viewpoint. No policy 
perspectives would be endorsed or disapproved. In this circumstance, 
the Court has long held that speech subsidies are “consistent with the 
First Amendment” because they “respect[] the principle of viewpoint 
neutrality.”329 For precisely this reason, in the 1983 case of Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation, the Court upheld the federal law 
deeming contributions tax-deductible if they are made to 501(c)(3) 
groups but not if they are made to other nonprofit groups.330 This tax 
deductibility is a selective subsidy, but no constitutional problem arises 
when “Congress subsidizes some speech, but not all speech” without 
“discriminat[ing] invidiously in its subsidies.”331 
Lastly, to be viable, quasi campaign finance vouchers would have 
to work out some tricky definitional issues. If an eligible voter decides 
to spend (not to donate) her voucher, on which activities may she use 
the money? Similarly, what may (and may not) a recipient group do 
 
 326. See The Federal Budget in 2019: An Infographic, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (Apr. 2020), 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56324 [https://perma.cc/VK5P-G8VG].  
 327. See supra Part I.D. 
 328. Another, more radical argument might be that vouchers violate the First Amendment 
because they force taxpayers to pay for political speech they do not support. Cf. Janus v. Am. 
Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018) (striking down arrangements 
under which “public employees are forced to subsidize a union, even if they . . . strongly object to 
the positions the union takes”). But see Elster v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 590, 592 (Wash. 2019) 
(rejecting this argument and upholding Seattle’s voucher program). 
 329. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234 (2000); see also, 
e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (“[R]eaffirm[ing] 
the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government’s provision of financial benefits.”). 
 330. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
 331. Id. at 548; see also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (upholding the 
“[n]ondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums expended to promote or 
defeat legislation”).  
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with its funds? 332  And what happens if a recipient group pays for 
electoral, nonelectoral, and nonpolitical communications? Does the 
group have to segregate its quasi campaign finance from the rest of its 
budget so that the vouchers flow only into the former? These issues are 
too fine-grained to explore here. But it is not obvious how to address 
them, and their proper resolution would plainly take time and care. 
C. Transparency 
Disclosure is the final regulation of quasi campaign finance I 
discuss. As with public subsidies, several measures could be devised to 
compel the release of information about nonelectoral, yet still political, 
spending.333  But in the interest of brevity, I comment on only one 
proposal: extending BCRA’s disclosure requirements for 
electioneering communication to quasi campaign finance. BCRA 
mandates that sources of electioneering communication identify 
themselves: “[e]very person who makes a disbursement . . . in an 
aggregate amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year.”334 
The statute further directs the quantities of electioneering 
communication to be made public: “[t]he amount of each disbursement 
of more than $200.” 335  The law instructs as well that the uses of 
electioneering communication be revealed: “[t]he elections to which 
the [disbursements] pertain and the names . . . of the candidates 
identified.”336  
I have in mind analogous disclosure requirements for quasi 
campaign finance. Actors who annually spend more than a certain total 
figure—whether they are individuals, corporations, unions, nonprofit 
 
 332. A related issue is that some charities currently use most of their budgets to pay for 
fundraising rather than programs or services. See, e.g., 10 Charities Overpaying Their For-Profit 
Fundraisers, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=topten. 
detail&listid=28 [https://perma.cc/X5ED-8KHT]. So would groups remain eligible for quasi 
campaign finance vouchers if they spent most of their proceeds on soliciting still more vouchers? 
 333. Another possibility is requiring disclaimers for nonelectoral, yet still political, 
communications identifying the messages’ funders. Cf. 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(2) (2018) (providing 
for such disclaimers for electioneering communication); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
366–71 (2010) (upholding these disclaimers). Still another idea is applying the disclosure 
requirement for grassroots lobbying to all taxpayers, not only 501(c)(3) groups that engage in 
lobbying. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620 (1954) (interpreting a lobbying statute to 
require disclosure of not only “direct pressures” but also those exerted “through an artificially 
stimulated letter campaign”); Briffault, Anxiety, supra note 45, at 187 (observing that “most state 
lobbying disclosure laws do cover some grassroots lobbying activity”).  
 334. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1). 
 335. Id. § 30104(f)(2)(C). 
 336. Id. § 30104(f)(2)(D). 
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groups, or other entities—would thus have to file reports with the 
government. These reports would list the amounts of nonelectoral, yet 
still political, disbursements. The reports would also specify the topics 
and modes of the outlays: the policy areas they involve and the means 
of communication for which they pay. A sample AFP entry, for 
instance, might state that the organization spent some sum on door-to-
door canvassing in a state in opposition to that state’s Medicaid 
expansion.337 
An obvious benefit of such disclosure is the prevention of 
corruption. As explained earlier, quasi campaign finance has at least 
some value for candidates.338 They may therefore be willing to trade 
official acts, access, or influence for the spending. At present, if such 
corrupt exchanges are consummated, no one necessarily knows about 
them. The quid does not have to be revealed, making it difficult to find 
out if it has been swapped for a quo. But if quasi campaign finance had 
to be disclosed, a spotlight would shine on nonelectoral, yet still 
political, disbursements. In the face of this publicity, both candidates 
and spenders would be less likely to make corrupt deals. They could 
not be as sure as before that their arrangements would stay secret. As 
the Court observed in Buckley, where it upheld FECA’s disclosure 
requirements, “exposure may discourage those who would use money 
for improper purposes.”339 “A public armed with information . . . is 
better able to detect any . . . special favors that may be given in 
return.”340 
A subtler effect of disclosure could be to promote greater 
communicative symmetry—and thus to curb corruption, distortion, 
and misalignment in a single stroke. If one actor currently outspends 
 
 337. For a similar proposal, focusing on “disclosure of all donors to social welfare 
organizations that engage in political activity,” see Roger Colinvaux, Social Welfare and Political 
Organizations: Ending the Plague of Inconsistency, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 501 
(2018).  
 338. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 339. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam). 
 340. Id.; see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (noting that, thanks to 
disclosure, “citizens can see whether elected officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed 
interests” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) 
(holding that disclosure requirements “deter[] actual corruption and avoid[] any appearance 
thereof”), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). That said, I agree with other 
scholars that “disclosure is not a strong anticorruption tool” because it merely “shed[s] a light” 
on potentially corrupt transactions rather than directly stopping them. Richard L. Hasen, Chill 
Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & 
POL. 557, 567 (2012) [hereinafter Hasen, Chill Out] (citing Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance 
Disclosure 2.0, 9 Election L.J. 273, 287 (2010)). 
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all other parties on quasi campaign finance, the other parties may not 
be aware of the imbalance. They may guess at, but they cannot be sure 
of, the volume of the first actor’s advertisements, rallies, door knocks, 
and so on. Oblivious to the extent to which they are outgunned, the 
other parties may fail to deploy all the resources at their disposal. They 
may not realize these assets are necessary in the debate. 
But if the other parties knew they were being outspent—thanks to 
disclosure—they could respond more forcefully. In Professor Anita 
Krishnakumar’s words, “greater transparency . . . could lead to more 
balanced political participation by interests on both sides of an issue, 
as opposing groups seek to match or ‘check’ each other’s efforts in true 
Madisonian fashion.”341 And if the communicative environment did 
become more symmetric, then for the reasons discussed above, fears 
about corruption, distortion, and misalignment might all recede. 342 
Quids with value for candidates would no longer be clustered in a 
single policy camp. Pressure on public opinion would be exerted in 
both directions. And officeholders would have dueling incentives after 
battle was joined, with both combatants (not just one side) inducing 
them to take certain stances. 
The constitutionality of disclosure, furthermore, is reasonably 
clear. In Buckley, the Court upheld FECA’s requirements that 
campaign contributions and express electoral advocacy be made 
public. 343  The Court also rebuffed First Amendment challenges to 
BCRA’s requirements that electioneering communication be 
accompanied by disclaimers and then summarized in reports—twice, in 
both McConnell 344  and Citizens United. 345  The same result would 
probably follow for the disclosure of quasi campaign finance. Such 
disclosure, like that of ordinary campaign finance, would impose some 
 
 341. Krishnakumar, supra note 45, at 517; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This 
“Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 559 (2008) 
(“D]isclosure will better inform competing interest groups about these activities, and so lead to 
greater and more equally matched interest group competition.”). 
 342. See supra Parts III.A–B. 
 343. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–84. 
 344. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194–202. 
 345. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71. The Court has also held that “[i]dentification of 
the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure” even in direct democratic 
elections not including candidates. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 
(1978). The Court has further approved the disclosure of “information from those who for hire 
attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose.” United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). 
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burden on speech and association rights.346 But this burden would be 
justified by the compelling interests served by the policy: informing the 
public about who is spending money on nonelectoral politics, and 
combating corruption, distortion, and misalignment.347 
A proviso is that, in its cases about the disclosure of regular 
campaign finance, the Court has held that particular plaintiffs may 
succeed in as-applied suits if they show a heightened risk of 
“harassment or retaliation.”348 The same exception would likely apply 
in the quasi campaign finance context. So, if there were evidence that 
a specific spender on nonelectoral politics would face reprisals if her 
activity were made public, this spender might be able to keep her 
disbursements confidential. However, this loophole has been a minor 
one historically under FECA and BCRA,349 and its infrequent usage 
would presumably persist here. Most payors of quasi campaign finance 
simply would not be able to link the disclosure of their outlays to 
significant adverse consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
In the legal academy, the study of money and power continues to 
focus, as it has for generations, on conventional campaign finance. Out 
in the world, though, America’s richest and most politically active 
individuals—the Koch brothers, Steyer, Bloomberg, and the like—are 
increasingly turning to another tool to influence the political process: 
 
 346. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (observing that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure 
requirements may burden the ability to speak”). 
 347. Other scholars have also noted the possibility of more aggressive disclosure 
requirements. See Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent 
Spending, 27 J.L. & POL. 683, 702–03 (2012) (“[T]here is a good argument that even broader 
definitions of . . . speech [to be disclosed] than BCRA’s ‘electioneering communication’ are 
constitutional.”); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions 
and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251, 257 (2004) (“If [BCRA’s] 
disclosure requirement is constitutional, why not a disclosure requirement in ballot measure 
elections?”).  
 348. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68; see also, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367, 370; McConnell, 
540 U.S. at 198–99. Also, as throughout this Part, I assume that quasi and regular campaign 
finance have the same legal status. If quasi campaign finance were treated as generic political 
speech, then its mandatory disclosure would be more dubious. See supra note 186 and 
accompanying text.  
 349. All such as-applied claims failed in Buckley, McConnell, and Citizens United. They only 
succeeded in Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87, 100 (1982), where 
the Socialist Workers Party established a “reasonable probability” of “threats, harassment, and 
reprisals” due to the disclosure required by an Ohio law. See also Hasen, Chill Out, supra note 
340, at 563 (summarizing the literature showing that “evidence of harassment of campaign finance 
contributors and spenders these days is sparse indeed”). 
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quasi campaign finance, the funding of nonelectoral communications 
with voters that nevertheless rely on an electoral mechanism to be 
effective. In this Article, I have described the little that is known about 
quasi campaign finance, much of which is hidden from public scrutiny. 
I have also weighed the arguments for and against treating quasi and 
ordinary campaign finance identically for First Amendment purposes. 
In my view, the legal status of quasi campaign finance is one of the most 
challenging issues in constitutional law. And I have evaluated several 
ways in which quasi campaign finance could be regulated (assuming it 
is, in fact, regulable). Ceilings on the activity seem unwise to me, but 
public subsidies and disclosure both promise substantial democratic 
benefits at little First Amendment cost. 
I want to close the Article with a call, familiar in these settings, for 
additional academic research. The narrower objective of this future 
work should be to further analyze quasi campaign finance: to learn 
more about its empirical properties, to probe its legal status more 
deeply, and to consider in more detail how it could be regulated. The 
broader aim of the literature, though, should be to remember that 
American politics is a vast, sprawling edifice, which affluent actors seek 
to penetrate using every technique they can think of. Regular campaign 
finance is one of these modes of entry. So is quasi campaign finance. 
But there are many more ways in which wealth tries to sway 
governmental policy, and scholars should examine them all. This 
relationship between money and power is the field’s true subject, of 
which quasi and conventional campaign finance are merely facets. 
 
